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Abstract  
Economic  diplomacy  and  commercial  diplomacy  as  soft  power  tools  plays  an  increasingly  significant  
role   in   the   enhancement   of   national   economic   goals   and   enhanced   economic   relations   between  
countries.  Economic  diplomacy  is  carried  out  by  a  government  to  support  its  foreign  policy  goals  or  
diplomacy   (or   both)   by   using   a   wide   range   of   economic   and   diplomatic   tools.   The   impact   of  
diplomatic  efforts   to  enhance  economic   relations  can  be  measured   through   the  growth  of  bilateral  
trade   and   FDI   over   a   period   of   time,   as   well   as   the   removal   of   trade   barriers   and   increased  
cooperation  in  international  organisations  like  the  World  Trade  Organization.    
  
“Foreign   policy   is   the   outcome   of   economic   policy,   and   until   India   has   properly   evolved   her  
economic  policy,  her  foreign  policy  will  be  rather  vague..”  -­  Jawaharlal  Nehru  
  
India’s   foreign   policy   has   increasingly   become   a   function   of   its   economic   policy,   and   economic  
goals.   As   these   goals   have   expanded   to   focus   on   different   regions   across   the   world,   India’s  
economic  diplomacy   toolkit   has  expanded   to   allow   for   the  participation  of  more  actors,   in   various  
arenas.  No  longer  can  India  rely  solely  on  the  soft  power  it  derives  from  a  shared  history  and  shared  
foreign  policy  principles.  With  bilateral  and  multilateral  economic  cooperation  expanding  across  the  
globe,  there  is  increasing  pressure  on  countries  to  harvest  both  soft,  hard  and  smart  power  efforts  to  
build   relations   that  serve   their  domestic  economic  and   foreign  policy  goals.     This   thesis  examines  
the  concept  and  practice  of  economic  diplomacy  as  it  relates  to  India  and  Africa.  While  the  existing  
literature  on  the  subject  is  extensive,  it  is  lacking  in  the  analysis  of  country-­level  exploratory  studies,  
and  comparisons  on  a  regional  level  across  the  African  continent.  More  specifically,  it  serves  as  an  
attempt   to   demonstrate   the   nuanced   nature   of   India’s   economic   diplomacy   efforts   in   Africa.   This  
study  examines  aspects  of  the  economic  diplomacy  of  India  as  it  relates  to  Nigeria  and  Kenya,  with  
the  aim  of  investigating  how  different  economic  diplomacy  efforts  have  translated  into  strengthened  
economic  relations  and  benefits.  These  efforts  are  measured  through  the  contribution  of  both  state  
activities  by   the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs,  and  non-­state  entities  such  as  business  organisations  
and  the  diaspora.  These  benefits  are  measured  in  the  study  through  trade  flows  and  foreign  direct  
investment   data.   The   discussion  makes   the   conclusion   that   economic   diplomatic   efforts   between  
strong   regional   economies   can   translate   into   enhanced   trade   and   investment   relations,   and   that  
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1.   Outline  of  Study  
  
India  has  become  an   important  economic  power,  currently  ranked  the  9thh   largest  economy  in   the  
world  (World  Bank,  2015),  and  forecast  to  be  the  third  largest  economy  by  2030  (Bloomberg,  2015).  
It  has  become  an  influential  actor  in  global  economic  decisions  as  part  of  both  the  G-­20  and  the  G-­
8+5  (the  G-­8  plus  the  five  leading  emerging  economies)  and  may  ultimately  attain  a  permanent  seat  
on   the   United   Nations   Security   Council.   India   used   to   pride   itself   in   its   socialist   ideals   and   non-­
aligned   stance   in   international   affairs,   but   is   now   considered   to   be   one   of   the   capitalist   and  
entrepreneurial   success   stories   in   the   last   twenty   years.   Economic   growth   of   7.05%   average  
(International  Monetary  Fund,  2015)  from  2000  to  2015  has  brought  with  it  economic  reforms  which  
have  raised  per  capita  GDP  and  lowered  poverty  rates,  accompanied  with  a  growing  self-­confidence  
in  international  fora  as  a  key  ally  and  as  a  swing  state  in  the  global  balance  of  power.  
  
Alongside   this,   Sub-­Saharan   Africa   has   seen   its   own   economic   rise.   The   region   is   the   world’s  
fastest-­growing  continent  and  over  the  next  decade  its  GDP  is  expected  to  rise  by  an  average  of  5%  
a   year,   due   to   increased   diversification,   foreign   direct   investment   and   increased   regional   and  
international  trade  (International  Monetary  Fund,  2015).  
  
India   and   the   Sub-­Saharan   African   region   have   had   a   long-­standing,   historical   relationship   and  
India’s  engagements  in  Africa  present  an  opportunity  to  further  understand  South-­South  relations  at  
the  intersection  of  political  and  economic  relationships  between  states.  The  third  India-­Africa  Forum  
concluded   in   New   Delhi   during   the   last   week   of   October   2015,   and   was   the  most   recent   formal  
attempt  to  foster  economic  and  development  ties  between  India  and  the  African  continent.    
  
Much  has  been  written  on   India’s   rise,  Africa’s   rise,   India’s  growing  presence   in  Africa,   the  rise  of  
the   Indian  multinationals   on   the   continent,   and   the   opportunities   for   greater   cooperation   with   the  
continent.   Scholars   such   as  Naidu   (2008),   Pham   (2007),  McCann   and  Mawdsley   (2011)   have   all  
presented  analysis  on   the  nature  and   impact  of   India’s  economic  engagements   in  Africa.  Overall,  
the  existing  analysis  focuses  on  the  region  as  a  whole  and  McCann  and  Mawdsley  (2011)  present  a  
more  regional  analysis  in  their  book  India  and  Africa  –  Changing  Geographies  of  Power.  However,  
while  there  is  a  large  amount  of  academic  focus  on  the  India-­South  Africa  relationship,  there  is  less  
of   a   focus   on   comparing   this   relationship   to   other   regional   “powers”   such   as  Kenya   and  Nigeria,  
both   the   largest  economies   in  East  and  West  Africa,   respectively.  The  existing   literature  primarily  
uses  FDI  and  trade  data  to  demonstrate  the  gains  from  increasing  cooperation  with  Africa,  and  this  
study  aims  to  contribute  in  a  similar  fashion,  but  comparing  these  gains  across  Nigeria  and  Kenya.    
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Economic  diplomacy1  plays  a  significant   role   in   the  enhancement  of  national  economic  goals  and  
enhanced   economic   relations   between   countries.   The   impact   of   diplomatic   efforts   to   enhance  
economic  relations  can  be  measured  through  the  growth  of  bilateral  trade  and  FDI  over  a  period  of  
time.   This   study   “starts   from   the   premise”   that   economic   diplomatic   efforts   between   “regional  
hegemons”  can  translate  into  enhanced  trade  and  investment  relations  and  that  India’s  efforts  in  this  
regard  can  be  considered  nuanced  and  vastly  different  in  different  regions  in  Africa.    
  
Given  India’s  rise  as  a  leading  emerging  market,  with  its  growth  philosophy  and  Indian  brands  and  
companies  permeating  throughout  the  rest  of  the  world,  alongside  the  rise  of  African  economies  in  
prominence  in  recent  years,  it  would  be  beneficial  to  understand  the  manner  in  which  these  states  
interact  and  how  foreign  economic  policy  shapes  or  is  shaped  to  reflect  these  interactions.    
  
1.1   Problem  statement  
  
The  problem  giving  rise  to  this  study  lies  in  the  attempt  to  understand  the  intersection  between  the  
state,  and   the  private  sector,  how   they   function  optimally  as  one   “foreign  policy  system”  and  how  
changes   in   economic   approaches   affect   foreign   policy.   As   countries   have   become   more  
economically   integrated,   the   prominence   of   non-­state   actors   in   the   foreign   policy   arena   has  
increased,   particularly   in   terms   of   global   economic   issues.   In   the   case   of   India,   the   role   of   large  
Indian  multinationals  and  their  prominence  in  Africa  has  begged  the  question  of  whether  they  have  
done   so,   independently   or   in   coordination   with   the   country’s   foreign   policy,   and   whether   India’s  
foreign  policy  has  adapted  to  accommodate  these  actors  or  not.  
  
1.2   Rationale  
  
This   study   aims   to   contribute   to   this   body   of   literature   by   demonstrating   through   country  
comparisons,   that   India’s   foray   into   Africa   is   a   function   of   its   foreign   economic   policy   evolution,  
armed   with   a   traditional   and   non-­traditional   foreign   policy   toolkit.   Understanding   the   deeper  
integration  of  countries,  and  the  manner   in  which  they  engage  with  one  another  directly   forms  the  
foundation   of   this   study.   This   is   particularly   true   for   middle-­power   countries,   engaging   with   one  
another  directly,  and  outside  of  international  and  regional  organizations.  More  importantly,  countries  
engage  with  one  another  at  the  intersection  of  domestic  and  international  political  relationships  and  
through  various  economic  actors  and  decisions.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Economic  diplomacy  can  broadly  regarded  as  cross-­border  economic  activities  from  one  state  to  another,  
which  involves  both  by  state-­level  and  non-­state  actors.	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1.3   Research  aims  
  
The   study   will   examine   how   India’s   foreign   policy   has   been   shaped   to   meet   its   international  
economic  goals,  and  how  this  has  been  applied  to  its  engagements  with  states  in  Africa,  through  the  
examples  of  two  very  different  African  countries.  It   is  increasingly  important  to  closely  examine  the  
nature  of  these  engagements,  to  identify  and  open  up  further  areas  of  cooperation,  to  the  benefit  of  
both  India  and  these  African  countries.    
  
From  a  theoretical  perspective,  the  biggest  aspect  that  will  be  explored  in  this  study  is  the  extent  to  
which   India’s   evolution   towards   soft   power   efforts   result   in   hard   economic   power   as   well   as   soft  
power   gains.   This   study   aims   to   contribute   to   the   existing   body   of   literature   on   India’s   economic  
diplomacy   in  Africa   by   demonstrating   through   country   examples   that   India’s   foray   into  Africa   is   a  
function  of  its  foreign  economic  policy  evolution,  armed  with  a  traditional  and  non-­traditional  foreign  
policy  toolkit.  It  examines  aspects  of  the  economic  and  commercial  diplomacy  of  India  as  they  relate  
to  Nigeria  and  Kenya,  with  the  aim  of  investigating  how  these  foreign  policy  efforts  have  translated  
into  strengthened  economic  relations  through  increased  trade  and  FDI.    
  
A  number  of  objectives  flow  from  this.  The  first  is  to  deepen  the  understanding  of  how  Indian  foreign  
policy   has   changed,   under   different   party   rule,   under   different   leadership   figures,   and   as   the  
country’s   economic   orientation   has   shifted.   This   objective   provides   a   basis   through   which   to  
understand  how  foreign  policy  is  made  and  how  it  has  evolved  in  India,  what  the  influencing  factors  
are,  and  how  different  parties  see  the  role  of  foreign  policy  in  its  strategic  agenda.  Through  the  use  
of  examples,  the  use  of  economic  diplomacy  as  a  foreign  tool  by  the  Indian  government  needs  to  be  
analyzed.    
  
The  second  is  the  study  of  the  nature  of  India’s  economic  engagement  in  Sub-­Saharan  Africa  and  
its   evolution   since  2000,  both   in   terms  of   increased  commercial   and  economic  diplomacy.  As   the  
fastest   growing   continent,   rich   in   natural   resources   needed   by   India,   and   home   to   some   of   the  
largest   Indian   diaspora   communities,   it   has   become   increasingly   important   to   understand   how  
India’s   foreign  policy  strategy  has  evolved  to   include  Africa.  This  section  of   the  study  will  examine  
the   foreign   policy   actors   and   their   influence   in   driving   India’s   Africa   agenda,   and   the   public   and  
private  drivers  of  this  strategy.  In  light  of  the  changing  nature  of  India’s  foreign  economic  policy,  we  
hope   to   demonstrate   how   India’s   engagements   in   Africa   represent   a   similar   confluence   of  
government  and  business  in  foreign  policy.    
  
	   10	  
This   confluence  will   then   be   practically   exemplified   by   looking   at   Kenya   and  Nigeria.   It   would   be  
useful  to  understand  any  similarities  and  differences  in  India’s  foreign  policy  strategies  towards  each  
of   these  countries,  and  the  drivers  of   these  differences.  These  countries  represent   two  regions  on  
the  continent   (East  and  West  Africa),  and  are  considered   to  be   the   largest  economies  (in  nominal  
GDP   terms)   in   these   regions.   Both   countries   have   large   Indian   diaspora   representations   and  
business   communities,   and   represent   complimentary   economic   structures   relative   to   India.   These  
country   examples   will   act   as   a   microcosm   to   understanding   whether   India’s   evolving   and   more  
flexible  foreign  economic  policy  towards  Africa  is  a  clear  representation  of  the  nuanced  nature  of  its  
overall  policy.    
  
1.4   Analytical  framework  
  
This   thesis   is   based   on   a   broadly   liberal   understanding   of   international   relations   as   involving   a  




An  important  component  of  this  study,  within  a  liberal  perspective  concept,  is  the  use  of  soft  power.  
Soft  power  is  the  ability  to  affect  others  to  obtain  outcomes  one  wants  through  attraction  rather  than  
coercion  or  payment  (Nye,  2008),  as  opposed  to  hard  power  which  specifically  refers  to  economic  
and  military  power.  Hard  power   relies  on   tangible  power   resources.  Economic  diplomacy  grounds  
itself   in   the   soft   power   sphere,   in   that   it   relates   to   the   relationships   and   interactions   between  
economic  entities,  whether  these  are  countries  or  companies,  in  the  private  and  public  sphere.    
  
Nye  (1990:154)  published  his  seminal  work  on  “soft  power”  emphasizing  the  shift  in  defining  power  
in   terms   of   population,   territory,   natural   resources,   economic   size,   military   force   and   political  
stability,   to   factors  of   technology,  education,   influence   in   international  organisations  and  economic  
growth.  He  states  that  “proof  of  power  lies  not  in  resources  but  in  the  ability  to  change  the  behaviour  
of   states”   (1990:155).   This   was   the   distinguising   factor   between   hard   and   soft   power.   The  
international  system  includes  more  non-­state  actors  than  countries  and  the  economic  resources  of  
these   actors   (transnational   corporations,   for   example)   far   outweigh   those   of   most   countries.   As  
actors  have  become  more  diversified,  so  have   the  goals  of  many  states.  National  security   threats  
now  include  the  economic  and  ecological,  and  not  merely  security  concerns.  More  importantly,  soft  
co-­optive  power  has  become  just  as  important  as  hard  power  in  promoting  culture  and  ideology  as  
attractive.   Nye   (1990:168)   describes   co-­optive   power   as   the   ability   of   a   country   to   “structure   a  
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situation  so  that  other  countries  develop  preferences  or  define  their  interests  in  ways  consistent  with  
its  own”.  
  
According  to  Nye  (2008:96),  a  country’s  soft  power  rests  primarily  on  the  following  three  resources:  
its  culture  and  the  level  to  which  it  is  attractive  to  others;;  its  political  values  and  how  it  acts  at  home  
and  abroad;;  and  its  foreign  policies  ,  and  how  legitimate  they  are,  and  the  level  to  which  it  increases  
its  moral  authrority.   In   the  economic  diplomacy  sphere,  engagements  between  countries  are  often  
motivated   by   shared   political   values   and   foreign   policy   goals.   Furthermore,   the   attractiveness   of  
“imported”   cultural   values   often   resonate   in   countries   that   have   large   diaspora   communities.   In  
terms   of   foreign   politics,   soft   power   has   led   to   countries   competing   on   how   credible   they   are.  
Whereas  previously,  economic  and  miltary  size  would  determine  the  power  players,  Nye  (2008:100)  
argues   that   in   an   information   age,   where   information   is   readily   produced   and   distributed,   the  
international  game  could  become  about  whose  “story”  wins.  Shashi  Tharoor,  the  former  Minister  of  
State   for   External   Affairs   in   India,   also   provides   a   definition   of   soft   power,   from   a   practitioners  
perspective   (2012:277):   “A   country’s   soft   power   to   me,   emerges   from   the   world’s   perceptions   of  
what   that   country   is   all   about”.   The   table   below   (Gilboa,   2008:61),   draws   on   Nye’s   work,   and  
demonstrates  the  differences  between  hard  and  soft  power  as  applied  by  states:    
  
Table  1:  A  comparison  between  hard  and  soft  power  
   Hard  Power  
Soft  Power  
Military   Economic  
Behaviour   Coercion;;  deterrence   Inducement;;  coercion   Attraction;;  agenda-­setting;;  co-­optation  











The   biggest   criticism   on   Nye’s   work   on   soft   power   was   that  many   states’   ability   to   exercise   soft  
power  only  existed  due   to  exercising   the  very  hard  power   resources  and  behaviour   shown   in   the  
table  above.  Furthermore,  often  soft  power  can  be  rendered  completely  useless  and  in  contradiction  
to   national      or   religious   values   (e.g.   American   values   are   rejected   by   countries   like   Iran).   In  
response   to   this,  Nye  and  many  other  scholars  presented  “smart  power”  as   the  ability   to  combine  
and  balance  hard  and  soft  power  (2004).  Wilson  (2008:111)  defines  smart  power  as  the  “capacity  of  
an  actor  to  combine  elements  of  hard  and  soft  power  in  ways  that  are  mutually  reinforcing  such  that  
the  actor’s  purposes  are  advanced  effectively  and  efficiently”.  
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Economic  Diplomacy  
  
If  soft  power  can  be  seen  as  a  foreign  policy  tool,  economic  diplomacy  can  be  considered  an  arena  
in  which  it  is  utilised.  Melissen  (2005:2)  describes  diplomacy  as  one  of  soft  power’s  key  instruments.  
Gilboa   (2008:56)   makes   the   argument   that   the   dramatic   changes   in   how   international   relations  
evolved,  has  demanded  a  transformation  in  the  goals  and  methods  of  foreign  policy.  Similarly  to  the  
discussion   above   on   “soft   power”,   territory   and   raw   materials   have   taken   a   backseat   to   image,  
reputation  and  the  means  of  attracting  and  persuading  states  towards  cooperation.    
  
“…   it   is   increasingly   difficult   to   distinguish   between   what   is   political   in   diplomacy   and   what   is  
economic,  and   indeed,  whether   there   is  a  dividing   line  between   the   two  which  has  any  validity  at  
all.”  2  
  
Diplomacy  should  be  seen  as  means  of  connecting  economies  and  states  with  the  aim  of  building  
social   relations,   both   domestically   and  within   the   broader   international   system.  Gilboa   (20008:57)  
draws  on  the  work  of  Signitzer  and  Coombs  (1992:138)  in  the  likening  of  diplomacy  to  a  method  of  
“public  relations”  for  states.    
  
For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  the  following  distinction  made  by  Lee  &  Hudson  (2004:358)  is  critical:  
diplomacy  should  not  be  seen  as  an   instrument  of   the  state  alone,  but  as   the  aggregate  of  public  
and   private   interests   within   the   state.   A  more   specific   definition   is   provided   by   Baranay   (2009:1)  
purports   that,   in  practice,   the  phrase  assumes   the  diplomatic  official  activities   that  are   focused  on  
increasing   trade  and   investment  as  well   as  participating   in   the  activities  of   international  economic  
organisations,   i.e.   acting   in   the   economic   interests   of   the   country   at   the   international   level.   He  
argues  that  the  following  factors  promote  economic  diplomacy  (2009:5):  
1)   global  and  regional  integration;;  
2)   the   rapid   expansion   of   the   market   economy,   alongside   liberalization   and   the   increasing  
international  interactions  between  countries  through  trade  and  FDI;;    
3)   the  aspirations  of  transnational  corporations  to  expand,  the  internationalisation  of  labour  and  
the  increasing  need  for  government  assistance  to  facilitate  this;;  
4)   the  increasing  need  for  countries  to  project  a  positive  environment  as  part  of  its  international  
image,  a  determinant  for  tourism,  trade  and  investment.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Meyer,  C.  1998.  British  Ambassador  to  the  US.  “The  Future  of  Diplomacy”.  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  
Office.    
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In  the  practice  of  economic  diplomacy,  the  actors  have  become  much  more  complex  as  the  global  
economic  and  political  environment  has  evolved.  While   the  ministries  of   foreign  or  external  affairs  
are   the   central   government   actor   in   most   countries,   Pigman   (2005:392)   argues   that   the   most  
significant   non-­foreign   ministry   actors   are   the   departments   of   international   trade,   industry   and  
finance,   as   well   as   central   banks.   However,   Huntington   (1978:71)   makes   the   argument   that  
matching  economic  power  to  foreign  policy  goals  more  often  than  not  present  different  challenges:  
bureaucratic   bottlenecks,   interest   group   influence,   parliamentary   processes   and   debate,   and  
alliance  diplomacy  between  countries.  The  arena  of  economic  diplomacy  usually  involves  activities  
that  require  a  hybrid  of  public  sector  and  private  sector  actors,  with  different  goals  and  strategies.  
  
Given  the  spaces  where  countries  engage  with  one  another  on  economic  diplomatic  activities,  there  
is   an   increasing   need   for   these   departments   to   work   cohesively   in   how   they   represent   their  
government,  on  a  national  and  sub-­national   level.  The  actors  become  responsible  for  wielding  soft  
power  as  an  economic  diplomacy   tool,   in  how   they  make   their  policies  and  practices  attractive   to  
others.   These   departments   work   alongside   non-­state   economic   entities   such   as   civil   society  
groupings  and  business   representation  organisations   such  as   chambers  of   commerce  or   industry  
organisations.   Saner   &   Liu   (2001:3)   describes   this   as   a   “multiplication   of   diplomatic   actors”   in  
economic   diplomacy   efforts   required   by   a   single   country.   Even   within   countries   and   within  
governments,  these  actors  have  multiplied  as  decentralization  and  devolution  of  power  to  provincial  
governments  or  counties  of  power  has   increased.   In   the  case  of   India  as  an  established  example  
and  Kenya  as  a  newer  example  of  how  devolution  of  power  has  been  put  into  practice,  regional  and  
local   authorities   have   increasingly   sought   to   promote   their   local   economies   through   international  
ties.   This   indicates   that   the   activities   that   constitute   economic   diplomacy   are   taking   place   on  
different  levels  of  government,  at  the  same  time.    
  
Orthodox   study   of   diplomatic   systems   focuses   on   interstate   politics   in   bilateral   and   multilateral  
settings,  while  new  diplomatic  studies  combine  economic  and  political  interests  at  both  the  domestic  
and   international   levels,   organized   by   government-­business   partnerships.   The   state   operates  
through  these  partnerships  in  the  global  economy,  rather  than  on  its  own.    
  
Lee  and  Hudson  (2004:343)  provide  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  changing  nature  of  diplomatic  
practice   in  a  number  of  states,  and   the  prioritization  of  commercial  and  economic  diplomacy.  The  
development  of  formal  business-­government  linkages  has  become  a  common  feature  in  the  foreign  
service  package.  With  this,  the  emergence  of  business  interests  within  diplomatic  systems  has  also  
emerged  (2004:344).  
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As   the   tool   to   carry   out   the   foreign   economic   policy,   economic   diplomacy   is   carried   out   by   a  
government   to   support   its   foreign   policy   goals   or   diplomacy   (or   both)   by   using   a   wide   range   of  
economic   tools   and   can   be   defined   as   diplomacy   where   diplomatic   means   are   used   to   achieve  
economic   and   foreign   policy   goals   (Haan,   2010;;  Okano-­Heijmans,   2008).   Alternatively,   economic  
diplomacy  can  be  understood  as  “the  process  through  which  countries  tackle  the  outside  world,  to  
maximize  their  national  gain  in  all  the  fields  of  activity,  including  trade,  investment  and  other  forms  of  
economically   beneficial   exchanges,   where   they   enjoy   comparative   advantage,   it   has   bilateral,  
regional  and  multilateral  dimensions,  each  of  which  is  important”  (Rana,  2007:1).    
  
The   concept   of   “economic   diplomacy”   is   often   used   interchangeably   with   commercial   diplomacy  
which,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasizes  the  government´s  role,  being  defined  as  “government  service  
to   the   business   community   [and   the   state],   which   aims   at   the   development   of   socially   beneficial  
international   business   ventures”   (Naray,   2010a).   A   simple   definition   is   provided   by   Lee   and  Ruël  
(2012:3):  “Commercial  diplomacy  is  the  international  relations  of  business”.  Commercial  diplomacy  
revolves   the  work   of   diplomatic  missions   in   support   of   the   home   country´s   business   and   finance  
sectors  and  “includes  the  promotion  of   inward  and  outward   investment,  as  well  as   trade”  (Ozdem,  
2009:8).   Commercial   diplomacy   consequently   includes   “all   aspects   of   business   support   and  
promotion  (trade,   investment,  tourism,  science,  and  technology,  protection  of   intellectual  property)”  
(Naray,   2010b:8).   Lee   (2004:51)   additionally   mentions   the   role   of   the   private   sector   by   defining  
commercial   diplomacy   as   “the   work   of   a   network   of   public   and   private   actors   who   manage  
commercial   relations   using   diplomatic   channels   and   processes”.   According   to   Lee   and   Ruël  
(2012:1),   the   emergences   of   economic   blocs   such   as   the   BRICS   have   refreshed   the   shift   in   the  
international  economic  environment  with  the  inclusion  of  new  big  companies  acting  transnationally.  
The  strategies  of  these  actors,  alongside  those  of  nation-­states  now  determine  the  trajectory  of  the  
global  economy.    
  
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  both  the  economic  and  commercial  diplomatic  aspects  in  the  study  of  
foreign   policy   are   employed.   A   working   definition   can   be   understood   as   follows:   Economic   and  
commercial   diplomacy   is   the   use   of   diplomatic   means   to   support   economic   and   commercial  
activities,   such   as   export   and   foreign   direct   investment   promotion.   It   is   pursued   with   resources  
available  to  the  home  country,  and  is  aimed  at  outputs  such  as  economic  stability,  the  expansion  of  
a   country’s   commercial   footprint,   a   national   competitive   advantage   and   economic   partnerships   in  
international   fora.  Countries   thereby   target  greater   cooperation  on  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  basis,  
employing  international  organisations,  regional  economic  communities  and  their  structures,  and  the  
private  sector  (both  domestically  and  abroad).    
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The  majority  of  the  literature  that  attempts  to  understand  this  is  centered  on  the  history  of  the  United  
States,  and   the  role  of  commercial   relations   to   further   the   interest  of   large  American  corporations.  
As   these  corporations  grow  and  globalize,   the  political  economies  of   the   trade  partners  of   the  US  
have  increasingly  demanded  the  attention  of  the  government.  Garten  (1997:69)  highlights  this  as  a  
tension-­filled  sphere,  where  the  values  widely  treasured  in  the  US  have  not  matched  the  economic  
and  political  goals  of   these  existing  and  potential  economic  partner  states.  The   justification  for   the  
government  devoting   this   level  of  attention   to  business   is  because   the  state  and  corporate  sector  
need  each  other  to  succeed.  However,  different  states  place  commercial  interests  at  different  levels  
of   centrality   in   foreign  policy.  Malmgren   (1972:44)  made  a   similar   point:   In   trying   the  address   the  
shortcomings  of  the  National  Security  Council,  and  New  Economic  Policy  in  as  early  as  1972  as  an  
example,  solving  the  interests  of  a  domestic  commercial  issue  demanded  a  balancing  or  bridging  of  
an   overseas   government’s   position,   with   a   domestic   American   policy   position.   Such   disputes  
eventually  led  to  the  creation  of  a  Council  of  Foreign  Economic  Policy  within  the  US  administration  
in  1954.  
  
As  early  as  1925,  Dennis  (1925:90)  wrote  a  paper  on  the  economics  of  diplomacy,  and  the  strategic  
importance  of  this  study  for  the  United  States  to  balance  being  the  wealthiest  country  and  managing  
the  benefits  of  “commercial  imperialism”,  with  the  costs  of  “military  imperialism”.  Trade  development  
needed  to  be  promoted  as  the  basis  for  international  friendship.    
  
It  is  also  critical  to  a  behavioural  approach  to  foreign  policy,  especially  in  terms  of  understanding  the  
variety  of  actors  and  mechanisms  involved  in  the  making  of  foreign  policy  and  seeking  correlations  
between  outcomes  and  circumstances  (Rohrlich,  1987:62).  Foreign  policy  may  also  be  defined  as  
the   interaction  of  state  behavior,   the  confluence  of  environmental   variables,  and   the  bureaucratic,  
structural  or  societal  dynamics  that  are  the  product  of  these  interactions.  
  
Yakop   and   van   Bergeijk   (2011:3)   discuss   economic   diplomacy   within   the   neoclassical   school   of  
thought.  The  primary  argument  from  this  school  of  thought  on  economic  diplomacy  would  be  that  it  
is  unnecessary,  because  firms  whose  products  or  services  are  competitive  enough,  should  be  able  
to  enter   foreign  markets  on   their  own,  without  government  assistance.   It  assumes   that   “economic  
diplomacy”  as  a  government   service  would  operate  at   the  same  cost   to   the  country  as  an  export  
subsidy.  However,   governments   need   to   be   involved   in   these   activities   because   certain   products  
and  markets  need  signaling  from  governments  as  to  their   importance  for  diplomatic  and  economic  
reasons.  Where  state-­owned  enterprises  or   infrastructural  projects  are   involved   in  FDI  projects   for  
example,   state-­to-­state   engagement   is   necessary,   either   to   welcome   or   promote   the   benefits   of  
these  projects.  Similarly,   the  promotion  of   trade   in  a  certain  group  of  products  or  services   require  
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negotiation  with  regards  to  tariffs  and  barriers  to  entry.  These  efforts  may  need  to  be  accompanied  
with   higher-­level   state   engagement   at   international   organisations   such   as   the   World   Trade  
Organization.  
  
1.5   Research  methodology  and  limitations  
  
The   larger   part   of   this   study   is   exploratory   as   it   attempts   to   understand   India’s   foreign   policy  
evolution,   and   how   its   engagements   with   Sub-­Saharan   Africa   are   viewed   within   this   context.   In  
particular,   the   emergence   of   economic   and   commercial   diplomacy   as   a   key   foreign   policy   tool   is  
examined.  The  literature  that   is  employed  is  a  combination  of  primary  sources  (from  former  Indian  
foreign  officers  and  Ministers)  and  secondary  sources  from  various  scholars  on  the  subject  of  Indian  
foreign  policy,  and  India-­Africa  cooperation.    
	  
The   final   chapter  will  make  use  of   two  examples   to  demonstrate   the  application  of   India’s   foreign  
policy   in   Africa,   through   economic   diplomacy.   This   study   will   be   historical   in   nature,   focusing   on  
foreign  economic  engagements  from  2000  to  2015,  as  measured  by  trade  flow,  and  FDI  flow  data,  
which  will  be  analyzed   through  comparisons  between  Nigeria  and  Kenya  as  examples.  To   further  
demonstrate   the   nature   of   these   engagements,   annual   reports   from   the   India   EXIM   Bank   and  
Ministry  of  External  Affairs  have  also  been  incorporated.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  this  study  is  
narrowed   to   India’s   outward   engagements,   and   excludes   the   reciprocal   engagements   by   actors  
from  the  three  example  countries  (e.g.  Kenya’s  economic  diplomacy  activities  towards  India).    
  
In  terms  of  the  literature  on  India-­Kenya  relations,  and  India’s  economic  diplomacy  strategy  towards  
Kenya  and  East  Africa  as  a  whole,  there  are  limited  academic  articles  that  investigate  this.  McCann  
(2010;;  2011)  and  Nzomo  (2014)  are  two  authors  who  have  focused  on  this  relationship,  particularly  
from  a  soft   power  perspective,   investigating   the  pragmatic  approach   that   India  has   followed   in   its  
engagements,  and  the  role  of  the  diaspora  in  promoting  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  in  Kenya.  In  
terms  of   the   literature  on  India-­Nigeria  relations,  and  India’s  economic  diplomacy  strategy  towards  
Nigeria   and  West   Africa   as   a   whole,   there   are   various   sources   of   literature   that   examine   India’s  
resource-­seeking  activities  in  Africa,  and  the  trade  relationship  with  India  in  particular.  
  
The   above-­mentioned   data   has   limitations:   credible   trade   flow   and   tariff   data   between   India   and  
Africa   is   only   available   from   TradeMap,   supplied   by   the   International   Trade   Centre   of   the  World  
Trade  Organization.  This  data   is  also  only  available  up  from  2001  until  2014.  The   incorporation  of  
data   from  as  early  as  1970  would  have  made  a  greater  contribution   to   the  study,  providing  a   real  
demonstration  of   the   impact   that   the  change   in   India’s  economic  diplomacy  approach  has  had  on  
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economic  activity.  Similarly,  data  on  country-­to-­country  foreign  direct  investment  from  India  to  these  
countries  is  only  available  from  2003  to  2015.  The  data  provided  from  The  Financial  Times  also  only  
examines   greenfield   investments,   which   are   cross-­border   physical   investments   that   companies  
make  in  a  foreign  country,  and  does  not  take  into  account  portfolio  investments  and  often  excludes  
M&A   (mergers   and   acquisition)   activity.   The   data   also   often   excludes   cross-­border   state   and  
parastatal-­led  infrastructure  projects.        
  
Finally,  a  large  portion  of  the  academic  literature  on  India-­Africa  economic  relations  has  been  done  
in  comparison  to  China’s  economic  relations  with  Africa.  A  number  of  studies  have  compared  and  
contrasted  the  different  nature  of  these  relationships,  often  with  the  aim  of  highlighting  the  different  
goals  and  methods  that  India  and  China  have  in  their  economic  relationship  with  different  countries  
across  Africa.  This  study,  however,  will  focus  solely  on  India’s  relationship  with  Africa,  since  the  aim  
is  to  examine  the  toolkit  that  India  uses,  and  not  compare  its  approach  with  other  emerging  powers.      
  
1.6   Chapter  outline  
  
The  remainder  of  the  thesis  will  be  structured  in  the  following  way:  
  
Chapter   2   outlines   the   changes   in   orientation   in   India’s   foreign   policy   space,   by   examining   the  
historical   trajectory  of   foreign  policy   in   India,  and   the   influence  of   changes   in   leadership  and  self-­
identity   in   the   Indian   state.   The   influence   of   the   federal   system   and   business   organizations,   the  
foreign  service,  and  the  diaspora  is  also  examined.  
  
In  2008,  after  the  India-­Africa  Forum,  Indian  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  declared  that  “no-­one  
understands  better  than  India  and  Africa  the  imperative  need  for  global  institutions  to  reflect  current  
realities  and  to  build  a  more  equitable  global  economy  and  polity”  (Malghan  &  Swaminathan,  2008).  
Chapter  3  aims  to  capture  these  trends  and  observations  as  a  function  of  India’s  changes  in  its  own  
foreign  policy  as  will  be  highlighted  in  this  chapter.      
  
In  Chapter  4,   India’s  nuanced  evolving   foreign  economic  policy   is  exemplified   in   its  engagements  
with  Nigeria  and  Kenya,  with  the  growing  importance  of  commercial  and  economic  diplomacy.  This  
will  be  demonstrated  with  data  comparisons  measuring  foreign  direct  investment,  trade  and  bilateral  
dialogues   and   agreements.   In   additions,   the   example   will   examine   state   assistance   in   economic  
diplomacy  -­  in  the  form  of  state  visits,  sub-­national  commercial  diplomacy,  and  engagements  in  fora  
such  as  the  World  Trade  Organization,  and  the  use  of  the  diaspora  business  communities.  What  is  
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very   clear   from   the   existing   literature   is   that   the   research   focus   on   a   country-­level   is   very   limited  
outside  of  the  India-­South  Africa  bilateral  relationship.    
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2.   The  evolution  of  India’s  Foreign  Economic  Policy    
  
2.1   Introduction  
  
Across  the  literature,  there  exists  no  single  government  statement  outlining  India’s  foreign  economic  
policy,  which  the  intersection  between  foreign  policy  and  a  country’s  economic  policy.  This  chapter  
aims  to  show  the  shifts  in  India’s  foreign  economic  policy,  before  and  after  the  Cold  War.  The  policy  
shifted  from  one  reliant  on  “self-­reliance”  and  non-­alignment  in  international  economic  affairs  before  
the   Cold   War,   towards   one   that   shows   India   embracing   its   membership   of   many   different  
international   fora.   This   shift   was   supported   by   economic   liberalization   domestically,   and   changed  
international   political   dynamics   after   the   dissolution   of   the   Soviet   Union.   The   different   officials  
leading   external   affairs   also   played   a   role   in   direct   India’s   foreign   economy   policy,   alongside   the  
Indian  private  sector.  The  alterations  of  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  are  a  result  of  both  domestic  
and   external   pressures   and   restraints.   More   importantly,   India’s   “sense   of   self”   under   various  
leaders   has   served   as   guidance   in   its   shift   from   an   inward-­focused,   self-­reliant   stance   to   an  
outward,  integrated  international  re-­orientation.    
  
The  reorientation  of  the  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  shows  very  clearly  that  India  has  recognized  
and  used   its   soft   power  as  an  economic  diplomacy   tool,   although   the   country’s   foreign  economic  
policies  have  not  intentionally  aimed  increase  its  soft  power.  
  
  
2.2   Shifts  in  foreign  economic  policy  ideology  in  India  
	  
2.2.1   India’s  foreign  economic  policy  before  The  Cold  War     
  
Chiriyankandath   (2004:200)   attributes   the   original   parameters   and   “tone-­setting”   of   Indian   foreign  
policy  to  Jawaharlal  Nehru,  the  country’s  first  prime  minister  after  independence.  This  is  due  to  the  
position   he   carved   out   during   his   seventeen   years   of   leadership,   placing   India   as   an   influencing  
power  in  Asia  and  Africa,  maintaining  neutrality  during  the  Cold  War,  and  as  a  frontline  participant  in  
the   Non-­Aligned   Movement.   According   to   Kale   (2009:43),   India’s   foreign   economic   policy   under  
Nehru  was  built   on   the   “conjoined  principles”   of   economic   self-­reliance  and  political   alignment,   or  
the   four   principles   of   “anti-­colonialism,   non-­alignment,   peaceful   co-­existence   and   renunciation   of  
force  in  the  settlement  of  international  disputes”  (Maitra,  1967:793).  Rubinoff  (1991:313)  makes  the  
point   that   a   key   characteristic   of  Nehru’s   neutralism  was  an  ambivalent   attitude   towards  both   the  
major   powers   and  other   states   in   the  non-­aligned  movement.   This  would   bring  a   large  degree  of  
criticism  from  other  states,  particuarly  after  the  Bandung  Conference  of  non-­aligned  countries,  held  
	   20	  
in   Indonesia   in  1955.  At   this  conference,   India  was   thought   to  have   failed   to   take   leadership,  and  
was  criticized  as  having  too  passive  an  approach  to  non-­alignment.  This  would  repeat   itself  at   the  
Belgrade  Conference  in  1961.    
  
Nehru’s   influence   on   Indian   foreign   policy   is   a   common   theme   across   the   literature   of   this   time  
period.  In  the  1950s  and  1960s,  in  particular,  Nehru  monopolised  foreign  policy  (Jain,  1990:75)  and  
was  virtually  unchallenged   in  his   stance  due   to  a   lack  of   interest,   basic  education  and  debate  on  
foreign  policy  issues,  even  though  he  passed  away  in  1964.  Mehta  (2009:221)  argues  that  Nehru’s  
understanding   of   “non-­alignment”   still   permeates   through   Indian   foreign   policy   thinking,   in   that  
Indian  policy  is  not  swayed  by  the  idea  of  balancing  power  between  itself  and  the  West,  or  itself  and  
China.  However,  as  will  be  discussed  below  and  in  later  chapters,  India’s  more  recent  foreign  policy  
decisions  to  align  with  the  groupings  such  as  the  BRICS  can  be  seen  as  another  movement  away  
from  Nehru’s  strict  non-­alignment  policy.    
  
The  Sino-­Indian  border  war  in  1962  served  as  a  turning  point  in  the  way  India  saw  the  world:  With  
the   leadership   change   to   Indira   Gandhi   in   1966,   the   world   according   to   India   was   composed   of  
threats   rather   than   opportunities,   while   maintaining   the   position   of   neutrality   –   a   more   realistic  
foreign   policy   view.      Ganguly   &   Pardesi   (2009:4),   two   of   the   most   prominent   scholars   on   the  
evolution   of   India’s   foreign   policy,   hold   the   view   that   India’s   foreign   policymakers   followed   an  
idealistic  foreign  policy,  to  their  detriment,  until  the  border  war  with  China  in  1962.  It  was  in  light  of  
this  event  that  Indians  began  to  privilege  the  idea  of  autonomy  in  its  engagements  with  other  states.  
Given  the  focus  from  the  rest  of  the  global  powers  on  the  Cold  War,  India  began  crafting  a  foreign  
policy   that  had   its   foundation   in  maintaining   the  greatest  possible   level  of   independence,  weighed  
down  by   the  colonial  history  of   the  country.  Maitra   (1967:794)  make   the  argument   that,  given   the  
limited  money  and  power   India   had  at   the   time,   it   could   not   be  expected   to   lead   the  non-­aligned  
movement.  Rather,  given  that  the  pillars  upon  which  India’s  foreign  policy  was  built  were  no  longer  
in  place,  it  was  time  to  reorientate  towards  a  more  self-­interested  view  of  the  international  system.    
  
During   her   first   tenure   as  Prime  Minister,   Indira  Gandhi  was   criticised   as   having   a   too   similar   an  
approach  to  foreign  policy  issues  as  Nehru  on  a  multilateral  level,  but  she  did  succeed  in  attempting  
to   reconcile   relations   with   China   and   Pakistan   (Rubinoff,   1991:326).  When   the   Bharatiya   Janata  
Party  (BJP)  took  over  in  1977,  the  Foreign  Affairs  Minister  A.B.  Vajpayee  make  significant  strides  in  
repairing  relations  with  China  and  Pakistan,  but  these  efforts  were  undermined  by  domestic  politics,  
as  well  as   the  Chinese   invasion  of  Vietnam  which  took  place  at   the  same  time  as  an  official  state  
visit  from  India  in  February  1979.  Their  focus  was  on  establishing  friendly  relations  with  the  United  
States,   particularly   on   issues   of   nuclear   disarmament,   and   appeasing   the   Soviet   Union.   Noorani  
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(1979:231)  describes  foreign  policy  under  the  BJP  as  being  even-­handed,  and  quotes  Vajpayee  as  
having  emphasized  that  continuity  in  foreign  policy  under  the  BJP  is  more  pronounced,  and  change  
in  policy  is  more  subtle.    
  
From   a   foreign   economic   policy   perspective,   in   the   decades   to   follow,   India’s   focus   on   non-­
interference  was  closely  mirrored  by  a  lack  of  involvement  in  the  global  economy.  Policies  of  state-­
led  industrialisation  coupled  with  “export  pessimism”  (Ganguly  &  Pardesi,  2009:10)  led  to  a  schism  
between   India  and   the   rest  of   the  global  economy.  Following   the  oil  crisis   in  1972,   India  chose   to  
spearhead   the   Group   of   77,   a   group   of   developing   countries   in   search   of   a   more   equitable  
representation  and   influence   in   the  global  economic  and  financial  system.  However,   India  was  not  
able   to  obtain  any  concessions   from  Organisation  of  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries   (OPEC)  as  a  
resource-­poor   developing   country.   India’s   influence   remained   limited   to  South  Asian   and   regional  
issues.  Sridharan  (2002:57)  brings  together  an  important  discusssion  of  the  necessity  of  economic  
strength   in  a  country’s  arsenal  of  both  hard  and  soft  power,  making   the  argument   that  states  who  
are   more   economically   powerful   are   better   able   to   command   diplomatic   influence,   particularly   in  
international  organisations.  The  lack  of  this  component  of  India’s  foreign  policy  arsenal  was  critically  
important  in  understanding  India’s  lack  of  influence  before  economic  liberalisation  would  take  place  
in  1991.    
  
During  the  1970s,  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  thrust  was  more  concerned  with  attracting  foreign  
aid   to   support   the   domestic   economy.   However,   the   economy   remained   strained   due   to   low  
productivity,  an   inefficent  public  sector,  and   the  high   levels  of  bureacracy  and   inefficiency   in   trade  
and   investment   policies.   Indira  Gandhi’s   second   tenure   from   January   1980  was   accompanied   by  
greater  domestic    stability  in  terms  of  her  power  base,  which  gave  her  greater  freedom  to  pursue  a  
larger   international   profile.  She   pursued   initiatives   in  Africa,  Asia   and   the  Middle  East,   using   fora  
such  as  the  Commonwealth,  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement,  the  Asia  Games  and  the  Delhi  Summit  in  
1983.  This  set  the  tone  for  her  son  Rajiv  Gandhi  to  follow,  particularly  in  his  stance  on  South  Africa  
and  the  diplomatic  pressure  that  India  exerted  on  the  country  to  end  the  apartheid  system.  What  is  
clear  from  the  leadership  of  the  different  Prime  Ministers  is  that  domestic  challenges  often  came  in  
the  way  of  placing   India  as  an  exemplary   leader  within   the  global   system.  During   Indira  Gandhi’s  
tenure,   sectarian   issues   in   states   such   as  Assam,   and   the  Punjab,   that   involved   other   countries,  
often  undermined  broader  efforts  at  multilateralism  and  bilaterlaism.  Similarly,  during  Rajiv  Gandhi’s  
tenur,   unresolved   issues   in   the   Punjab,   Assam   and   the   Muslim-­Hindu   discord   undermined   his  
position   internationally.   This   is   a   challenge   that   has   repeatedly   played   itself   out:   the   inability   of  
leaders  to  infuse  the  country  with  high  purpose  (Mansingh,  1984:207).    
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Within   the   realist  perspective,  one  could  argue   that   the  shaping  of   India’s   foreign  policy  has  been  
justified  in  terms  of  the  “national  interest”  (Chenoy,  2007:3553)  and  gaining  a  greater  power  status  
within  the  international  system.  An  interesting  point  made  by  Mistry  (2003:2948)  is  that,  based  on  its  
foreign  behaviour  stance,  India  had  chosen  to  try  “to  be  everything  to  everybody”  in  its  application  of  
neutrality,  opting  to  be  affected  by  events  rather  than  control  them.  Mehta  (2009:218)  explains  how  
India’s  identity  is  largely  grounded  in  power,  but  this  power  is  defined  by  the  power  of  its  example:  
By   showing   the   rest   of   the   world   how   to   maintain   a   strong   democracy,   manage   its   diverse  
population   and   have   a   distinuguised   economy,   it   could   be   seen   as   a   great   power.   According   to  
Kapur   (2009:200),   India’s   foreign   policy   in   the   1980s  was   characterised   by   a  mismatch   between  
India’s   ambitions   to   be   a   major   power   within   the   international   system   coupled   with   a   decline   in  
economic  influence.  This  was  easier  to  implement  until  a  lack  of  capital  funds  forced  the  country  to  
interact  with  partners  on  both  sides  of  the  Cold  War,  and  integrate  itself  in  global  supply  chains,  the  
international  trade  system  and  the,  albeit  slow,  reception  to  international  investment.    
  
Pant  (2009:97)  highlights  an  important  point  in  understanding  foreign  policy  from  India’s  perspective  
and  that   is  the  “lack  of  an  instinct  for  power”.  Understanding  the  foreign  policy  stance  of  a  country  
lies   in  the  way  it  exercises  military,  economic  or  political  power.  This   is   line  with  the  work  of  Hans  
Morgenthau   (1948)      who   argues   that   the   prestige   of   a   nation   lies   in   its   reputation   for   power.  
Similarly,  Mehta   (2009)   argues   that   the   gap  between  aspiration   and  ability   in   the  way   India   sees  
itself,  is  the  root  cause  of  the  absence  of  foreign  policy  frameworks.  Most  of  the  scholastic  analysis  
on   the   topic   has   been   through   an   ad-­hoc   examination   of   India’s   performance   on   international  
economic  indicators  or  its  foreign  policy  decisions  and  actions  in  international  economic  “events”.    
  
The   theme   of   non-­alignment   within   the   evolution   of   India’s   foreign   policy   in   the   past   20   years  
warrants  discussion.  While  political   rhetoric  has  always   reiterated   India’s   stance  of  neutrality,  and  
non-­alignment  within   international   political   affairs,   its   economic   engagement  with   the   international  
system  provides   examples   of   an   alignment  with   the  Global  South   in  multilateral   fora   such   as   the  
World  Economic  Forum,   the  World  Trade  Organization  and   the  Group  of  20.  Chenoy  (2007:3551)  
observes   that,   officially,   India   continues   to   adhere   to   the   concept   of   non-­alignment   within   a  
multipolar   world,   with   muliple   power   nodes   and   coexistence   of   states   with   multiple   cultures   and  
markets   and   multilateral   institutions   and   international   laws.   India   sees   a   multipolar   international  
system  as  an  extension  of  the  concept  of  non-­alignment,  according  to  Chenoy.  Its  foreign  economic  
policy   is   influenced   by   the   need   for  multipolarity   and  not   the   over-­dominance   of   one   power.  One  
could   argue   that   this   demonstrates   a   shift   from   a   “belief   system”3   model   of   decision-­making   on  
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foreign  policy,  where  concepts  and  values  are  the  key  driving  factor,  towards  a  more  “incremental”4  
model,  where  policy-­makers  make  decision  within  a  general   framework,  but  adjust  according   to  a  
changing  factor  or  environment.  Within  the  foreign  policy  space,  countries  adopting  the  latter  model  
are   often   characterised   as   “muddling   through”   and   not   making   bold   decisions,   but   allowing   for  
flexibility   and   consultation,   as   described   by   Lindblom   (1959).   Chiriyankandath   (2004:200)   claims  
that  choosing  to  be  non-­aligned  in  its  engagements  with  other  countries,  during  the  time  of  the  Cold  
War,   was   as   strategic   and   it   was   a   principled   choice   to   achieve   peace   in   a   divided   international  
system  
  
Criticism   of   this   position   was   that   it   never   resonated   in   domestic   economic   policies,   and   some  
policies  were  actually  to  the  country’s  detriment,  for  example  India’  support  for  OPEC  concessions,  
which  increased  the  price  of  oil.  This  brought  about  a  change  in  India’s  foreign  policy  once  the  Cold  
War   ended,   bringing   along   with   it   various   challenges   to   both   the   political   leadership   making   the  
policy,  and   the  bureaucrats  putting   them   into  practice.  The   reorientation   included  an  openness   to  
engagement  with  the  United  States  and  the  Western  alliance,  a  strong  focus  on  domestic  economic  
policies,   increased  attention   to   building   up   the   country’s  military   capabilities   and   finally,   a   greater  
role  for  India  and  India’s   interests  in  the  global  system.  The  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  further  
added   to   the   need   for   a   change   to   the   country’s   state-­led   and   state-­regulated   industrialisation  
approach,  and  this  further  emphasised  the  need  for  a  change  to  foreign  policy.  This  even  led,  under  
the   direction   of  Manmohan   Singh,   the   Finance  Minister   at   the   time,   to   India   entering   a   strucural  
adjustment  program  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund.    
  
2.2.2   India’s  foreign  economic  diplomacy  after  the  Cold  War  
  
On  an  economic  level,  India’s  fiscal  crisis  due  to  the  Gulf  War  in  1991  and  the  oil  price  effect  on  the  
economy,   forced   a   re-­evaluation   of   the   country’s   international   economic   policies,   by   the   then  
Finance  Minister  Manmohan  Singh.  The   initial   considerations   to   liberalise   the  economy  had  been  
put  on  the  table  by  Prime  Ministers  Indira  Gandhi  and  Rajiv  Gandhi.  
  
Sridharan  (2002:58)  makes  the  argument  that,  by  the  1990s,  the  growing  interconnection  between  
economics   and   foreign   policy   could   not   be   ignored   by   the   different   actors   in   the   international  
system.   Crafting   foreign   policy   strategies   have   increasingly   involved   strategies   to   increase   a  
country’s  clout  abroad,  using  the  attractiveness  of  its  domestic  priorities.    
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At  the  time  of  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  in  November  1989,  the  Congress  Party  saw  itself  defeated  in  
the  general  elections.  Not  only  did  India  have  to  grasp  the  changed  world  in  which  it  had  orientated  
itself  post-­Cold  War,  it  also  had  to  adopt  a  realist  perspective  different  to  the  Nehruvian  perspective  
that  had  guided  foreign  policy  up  until  then.  The  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  international  system  
were  a  guiding  factor  to  India  to  change  its  strategic  alliances,  particularly  if  it  wished  to  craft  a  place  
in   the   international   economy.   Rather   than   align   itself   to   the   smaller   economies   within   the   Non-­
Aligned  Movement,   it  saw  better  opportunities   to   forge  strategic  economic   relationships  with  other  
South   Asian,   Southeast   Asia,   East   Asia   and   the   USA   and   EU.   This   formed   the   basis   of   India’s  
foreign  economic  relations  since  the  1990s.      
  
The  fall  of  Communism  in  Eastern  Europe  took  place  simultaneously  to  a  change  in  leadership  and  
a  greater  movement   to  a  more   realist   foreign  policy  perspective.  Ganguly   (2004:41)   identifies   the  
Cold  War  as  a  turning  point  for  India’s  foreign  policy.  Its  stance  of  non-­alignment  served  as  India’s  
ability  to  remain  dissuaded  to  support  a  side,  and  pursue  its  own  interests.  More  importantly,  India  
took  a  representative  position  that  outweighed  its  hard  power  traits.  In  this  position,  India  emerged  
as  a  “champion  of  the  world’s  poor  and  dispossed”  (Ganguly,  2004:41)  –  calling  for  the  reform  of  the  
global  foreign  aid  regime,  bodies  like  the  IMF  and  increased  equality  in  international  reform.    
  
The   increasingly   louder   voices   of   policy-­makers   encouraging   more   pragmatism   and   structure   in  
Indian  foreign  policy  making,  rose  after  the  Cold  War.  This  further  reinforced  the  primacy  of  national  
interests,  but  emphasized  a  increasing  need  for  flexibility  in  its  ideologoies  and  how  it  pursues  this  
interest.   The   end   of   the   Cold      War   brought   with   it   a   realisation   that   “non-­alignment”   as   the  
foundation  of  foreign  policy  was  not  the  best  way  for  India  to  proceed  in  its  strategic  engagements  
with  the  rest  of  the    world.  This  realisation  can  be  seen  as  a  movement  from  the  idealist  perspective,  
which   relied  on  nomrative   judgements  on  how   India   regarded   its   own  and  other   states  behaving.  
Internationalism   has   always   underpinned   idealism,   and   “neo-­idealism”   in   particular   (Heywood,  
2007:129).    
  
At  the  forefront  of  this  movement  was  Jaswant  Singh  who  would  go  on  to  become  the  Minister  for  
External  Affairs   from  1998   to  2002  and   then   finance  minister   in   the  Vajpayee  administration.  The  
Bharatiya  Janata  Party  adopted  a  foreign  policy  orientation  centred  on  a  pursuit  of  national  interest  
as  the  main  driver  (Chiriyankandath,  2004:201).  Hall  (2010:602)  argues  that  the  new  realist  stance  
that  arose   in   India’s   foreign  policy  after  1991  was  driven  by   indigenous   factors   like   the  economy,  
and  Western  influences  –  with  decisions  driven  by  measuring  interests  rather  than  moral  alliances.  
For  many  scholars  of   the   realist   school  of   thought,   India’s  prominence   in   the   international  system  
	   25	  
was   held   back   by   its   idealistic   stance   and   its   need   to   be   a   moral   example   to   other   developing  
countries.    
  
Ollapally  and  Rajagopalan  (2011:145)  argue  that  India’s  foreign  policy  has  always  been  grounded  in  
a   nationalist   perspective,   but   has   been   forced   to   become   increasingly   pragmatic.   The   nationalist  
perspective   was   borne   out   of   India’s   Cold   War   foreign   policy,   and   its   view   of   “non-­alignment”,  
emphasizing  every  country’s  sovereignty.  To  the  nationalists  within  India’s  decision-­makers,  India’s  
capacity   for   “strategic   autonomy”   (Ollapally   and   Rajagopalan,   2011:146)   was   the   primary   goal:  
Given  constant  pressure   to   “pick  a  side”  by  other  world  powers,  whether   this  be  China,  Russia  or  
the  United  States,  India’s  foreign  policy  needed  to  ensure  that  its  own  interest  was  the  primary  aim.  
In  practice,  this  meant  that  alliances  were  steered  away  from.  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh,  in  
2010,  maintained  that  “India  is  too  large  a  country  to  be  boxed  into  any  alliance”5.    
  
Across   the   analyses   of   India’s   foreign   policy   evolution,   is   the   role   that   specific   individuals   have  
played.  Chatterjee  (2013:14)  makes  the  point  that  foreign  policy  is  highly  individualistic  and  lacks  a  
long-­term   view   of   its   foreign   policy   goals.   An   interesting   point   Chatterjee   raises   is   that   the   small  
group   of   Indian   political   elite   that   direct   Indian   foreign   policy   are   sceptical   of   what   the   West  
perceives  as   India’s   rise,  and   the  accompanied  expectations   that   the  country’s  economic   rise  has  
brought  for  its  international  role  in  global  affairs.  This  observation  is  based  on  the  highly  indivualistic  
nation  of   foreign  policy  decisions  within   the   Indian   foreign  policy  space,  discussed  earlier.  On   this  
point,  Chatterjee  (2013)  describes  India  as  a  “would-­be  great  power  resisting  its  own  rise”.    
  
Mohan   (2006:17)   identifies   three   strategic   “circles”   that   can   be   used   to   describe   India’s   foreign  
policy   after   2000,   as   the   country’s   economic   rise   attracted   significant   attention.   In   the   first   circle,  
were   issues   that   related   to   India’s   immediate   neighbourhood   where   the   country   has   followed   an  
identity  of  primacy  or   the   regional   “hegemon”.  The  second  circle  would  encompass   the   ‘extended  
neighbourhood’:  where  India  acted  in  a  realism  approach  with  regard  to  protecting  its  interests  and  
balance   other   powers   such   as   China.   The   third   concentric   circle   is   the   rest   of   the   international  
system,  where  India  has  sought  to  use  its  economic  clout  to  act  as  a  great  power.  Implementing  this  
kind  of  strategy  was  difficult  when  following  a  socialist  system  which  led  to  economic  decline  and  a  
decline  in  influence,  especially  after  independence.  This  system  basically  removed  the  second  and  
third  circles  from  India’s  strategy.  However,  this  problem  and  India’s  alliance  with  the  Soviet  Union  
during   the   Cold   War   were   removed   at   the   start   of   the   1990s,   with   economic   liberalization   and  
openness  allowing   the  country   to   revisit   its   foreign  policy  outside  of   its  direct  neighbourhood.  This  
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saw  India  form  alliances  with  the  United  States,  China  and  the  Commonwealth  countries.    In  2002,  
a   group   of   scholars   and   former   government   officials   presented   a   proposal   report   on   a   possible  
blueprint   for   India’s   foreign   policy,   entitled  Non-­Alignment   2.0.  Ganguly   (2012)   acknowledged   the  
merit   in  conducting  such  a  study  laid  in  its  highlighting  of  a  core  weakness  of  Indian  foreign  policy  
across  the  past  few  decades:  India  has  developed  a  tendency  to  deal  with  important  foreign  policy  
decisions,  whether  economic,  political  or  security,  with  a  broad  general  approach.  
  
Ganguly  (2004:42),  introduces  the  idea  of  moral  suasion  to  describe  India’s  foreign  policy  after  the  
Cold   War:   while   the   country   took   a   backseat   to   the   disputes   between   the   global   powers,  
disproportionate  to  the  role  of  its  military  and  geopolitical  importance.  Rather,  India  raised  its  voice  
for  the  concerns  of  the  decolonized,  non-­industrialised  countries.  Furthermore,  India  advocated  for  a  
change   of   the   global   foreign   aid   regime,   a   fairer   negotiation   regime   within   the   World   Trade  
Organisation  and  the  reform  of  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  to  better  reflect  and  protect  the  concerns  of  
weaker  states.  One  could  argue  that  this  would  form  the  basis  of  India  joining  the  IBSA  (India-­Brazil-­
South  Africa)  trilateral  in  2003,  and  then  later  the  formalised  BRICS  (Brazil,  Russia,  India,  China  and  
South  Africa)  grouping  of  countries   in   the  2000s.   India’s  membership  of   these  bodies  solidified   its  
movement   from   non-­alignment   in   its   foreign   relations,      to      the   country   “throwing   its   hat”   into   an  
alliance  with  other  emerging  powers  with  shared  domestic  and  broader  economic  goals,  alongside  
shared  ideals  of  a  fairer  international  economic  regime.    
  
2.3   India’s  foreign  policy  in  practice  today  
	  
2.3.1   The  influence  of  economic  policy  
  
Bhambri   (1982:51)  makes   the   argument   that   the   Indian   government   had   oft   found   themselves   in  
contradiction   with   its   own   foreign   policy   of   non-­alignment   and   a   degree   of   anti-­imperialism,  
particularly  when  it  came  to  global  capitalism.  This  was  primarly  due  to  previous  economic  policies  
not  pursuing  a  policy  of   self-­reliance  and  domestic  economic  development.     This   chapter  aims   to  
discuss  the  influence  that  the  liberalisation  of  India’s  economy  has  had  on  Indian  foreign  policy.    
  
For  India’s  economy,  the  1990s  started  as  a  difficult  time  with  a  high  fiscal  deficit,  declining  growth  
amd  a  decline   in   the  country’s  hard  currency   reserves  and  high   levels  of   foreign  debt.  One  of   the  
main   factors   that   drove   the   economic   transformation   from   inward-­   to   outward-­focused   was   the  
change   in   perspective   amongst   the   decision-­making   elite   in   India’s   economic   and   foreign   policy  
sphere  (Kale,  2009:50).    
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One  of   the  main   factors   that   drove   the  economic   transformation   from   inward-­   to  outward-­focused  
was   the  change   in  perspective  amongst   the  decision-­making  elite   in   India’s  economic  and   foreign  
policy   sphere   (Kale,   2009:50).   At   the   start   of   Indira   Gandhi’s   final   term   of   office,   India   started  
undergo   focused   liberalisation:   with   the   state   removing   price   controls,      and   lifting   licencing  
requirements.   While   these   had   a   limited   effect   on   the   economy,   futher   liberalisation   was  
aggressively   implemented  by   the  Rajiv  Gandhi,  until  public  support   for   the  party  declined,  as  was  
evident  in  the  elections  of  1987.  
  
At  the  start  of  Indira  Gandhi’s  final  term  of  office,  India  started  undergo  focused  liberalisation:  with  
the  state  removing  price  controls,    and  lifting  licencing  requirements.  While  these  had  a  limited  effect  
on  the  economy,  futher  liberalisation  was  aggressively  implemented  by  the  Rajiv  Gandhi,  until  public  
support   for   the   party   declined,   as   was   evident   in   the   elections   of   1987.   Due   to   far-­reaching  
liberalisation   reforms,   which   included   reforming   the   financial   system   and   investment   environment  
and   decreasing   the   government’s   share   of   public   enterprises.   These   reforms   were   rolled   out   to  
different   sectors   and   also   included   a   change   to   the   exchange   rate   regime   in   1992.  Due   to   these  
mesasures,   the  middle   class   in   India  grew  and   foreign  direct   investment   poured   into   the   country.  
The  growth  of  the  domestic  economy  due  to  these  reforms  also  cushioned  India  during  the  South-­
East  Asian  financial  crisis  in  1997.  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  India  entered  the  2000s  as  one  of  
the   world’s   fastest   growing   economies,   with   a   robust   domestic   market,   and   a   growing   corporate  
sector.   The   implications   for   India’s   foreign   policy   during   this   period  were  more   coincidental,   than  
planned.  Malone   (2011:90)  makes   the  argument   that   it  was   rather   the  slow  growth  and  economic  
pressure   from  mismanagement   rather   than   international  pressures,   that  drove   the   liberalisation  of  
the   Indian   economy.   The   liberalisation  measures   were   a  movement   away   from   socialism,   at   the  
same  time  as  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  and  the  Soviet  bloc.    
  
The  federal  systerm  in  India  has  also  created  the  arena  for  sub-­national  governments  to  act  within  
the   foreign   policy   space,   although   foreign   policy   is   made   at   the   central   level.   With   increasing  
competition  amongst  states,  economic  diplomacy  became  a  key  activity  for  state  governments  with  
chief   ministers   engaging   in   outbound   trade   and   investment   missions,   destination   marketing   and  
building   relationships   with   other   sub-­national   governments   globally   (Sridharan,   2002:69).   Prime  
Minister  Narendra  Modi’s  activities  in  the  Gujarat  state  are  a  prime  example  of  this.    
  
Malone   (2011:75)   describes   India’s   economy  as   its   “global   calling   card”,   due   to   the   impact   it   has  
had   on   power   relationships   between   India   and   the   rest   of   the   world   and   its   clout   in   global  
institutions.  Since  the  1990s,  India’s  foreign  poicy  was  been  most  heavily  influenced  by  its  economic  
evolution  and  rapid  growth.     Chaudhuri      (1995:999)  highlights   the      intersection  between  economic  
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reforms  and  liberalisation  and  India’s  foreign  policy.  While    the  economic  reforms  of    1991    opened  
the  country  to  inward  FDI  and  capital  flows,  and  heralded  a  new  era  of  industrialisation,  the    influx  of  
foreign  business  seemed  to  ignite    a  furore  amongst  local  Indian  companies  to  exert  influence  over  
economic  policies,  particularly  those  related  to  trade  and  activity  in  restricted  industries.  Indigenous  
enterprises   have   had   to   compete,   partner   with,   or   be   absorbed   by   incoming   foreign   companies,  
particularly  in  previously  protected  industries  such  as  textiles  and  fertilizer.  Given  India’s  size  of  its  
domestic   market,   many   multinationals   have   entered   the   market   for   export-­oriented   projects,   and  
domestic-­oriented  projects.        
  
Nayar  (1998:2453)  argues  that  the  economic  policy  shifts  that  occurred  since  1991  in  India  led  to  an  
improvement   in   the  balance  between  globalisation  and  nationalism   in   the   Indian  economy.  These  
reforms   evoked   different   responses   from   different   business   groups.   One   of   these   was   the  
Federation   of   Indian   Chambers   of   Commerce   and   Industry   (FICCI).   Originally   aligned   to   the  
nationalist  movement,   the   organisation  was   the  most   influential   business   association   in   India   but  
was   isolated   from   the   government   and   its   objectives,   due   to   their   preference   for   a   socialist  
organisation  of  the  economy.  Another  business  group  was  the  Associated  Chambers  of  Commerce  
and   Industry   (Assocham),  which,  although   it  had   Indian  members,  was  more   focused   towards      its  
foreign   multinational   membership.   According   to   Nayar   (1998:2453),   the   work   of   these   two  
organisations   was   overshadowed   by   the   Confederation   of   Indian   Industry   (CII)   which   was  
considered  to  be  more  representative  of  modern  Indian  business,  with  greater  resources.  All   three  
these   organisations   were   disenchanted   by   the   government’s   push   for   economic   reforms,   and  
especially  the  openness  to  foreign  capital  which  threatened  to  destablise  the  market  positions  that  
many   of   the   members   of   these   organisations   had   accrued.   Since   firms   in   India   still   operated  
primarily   as   family-­owned   business,   in   the   commodity-­producing   sectors,   rather   than   firms   with  
known   consumer   goods   branding,   the   threat   of   foreign   capital   remained   a   big   concern   for   these  
above-­mentioned   organisations.   A   massive   concern   to   these   businesses   was   also   the   lack   of  
support  provided  by  the  government  to  adjust  to  the  shock  of  a  more  open  economy  and  the  entry  
of  foreign  businesses.  This  discontent  amongst  the  private  sector  was  available  to  the  BJP  to  exploit  
politically  to  a  large  degree,  because  their  issues  played  to  their  ideological  position.    
  
2.3.2   The  institutional  structures  supporting  economic  diplomacy  
  
A  common   theme  amongst  scholars  on   the  subject  of   India’s   international  economic  diplomacy   is  
the  lack  of  coordination  and  coherency  in  understanding  India’s  decision-­making  on  a  bilateral  and  
mulitlateral  level  (Mistry,  2009).    As  far  as  the  role-­players  in  India’s  foreign  policy  environment  are  
concerned,  they  are  divided  into  three  groups:  The  office  of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  National  Security  
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Council,  and  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  (Chatterjee,  2013:15).  Across  all  these  groups,  officials  
at  all   levels  are   from   the   Indian  Foreign  Service.  This   institution  was  borne  out  of   the   Indian  Civil  
Service  and  the  Indian  Political  Service,  both  of  which  were  created  by  the  British,  and  which  were  
the  source  of  many  officers  into  the  Indian  Foreign  Service  after  it  was  created  upon  independence  
in  1947.      
  
Until   today,   it   is   considered  one  of   the  most  prestigious  parts  of   Indian  civil   service,   to   the  extent  
where   India’s   foreign   service  posts  abroad,   at   all   levels  of   seniority,   are   filled  by  members  of   the  
Foreign  Service  or  career  civil  servants  as  they  have  become,  instead  of  political  appointees  as  one  
sees   in   countries   like   the  United  States,  South  Africa   and  Brazil.   It   is   to   this   end,   given   the   long  
tenures      and   high   levels   of   responsibility   that   Foreign   Service   officials   hold,   that   foreign   policy  
decision-­making  processes  have  become  highly   individualistic  (Chatterjee  2013:16).  What  this  has  
resulted  in,  is  a  lack  of  collective  thinking  in  making  foreign  policy  strategy,  and  more  individualistic,  
ad-­hoc   decision   making   and   personalised   strategic   planning.   An   additional   point   raised   by  
Chatterjee  is  that,  in  addition  to  this  autonomy  in  decision-­making,  foreign  service  officials  also  work  
within  “anonymity  of  action”  (2013:17).  Since  the  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Minister  take  ultimate  
responsibility   for   the  country’s   foreign  policy  direction  and  action,   these   factors  have   resulted   in  a  
bottom-­up  approach  to  policy-­making  process.    
  
Rana   (2004:67)   provides   interesting   insight   into   India’s   model   of   economic   diplomacy,   from   a  
practitioner’s  perspective.  He  observes  that,  since  the  1973  oil  crisis,  economic  diplomacy  become  
the  central  work  of  Indian  diplomatic  missions  across  the  world.  An  important  component  of  India’s  
economic   diplomacy  model   lies   in   the   use   of   business   associations   and   the   diaspora   to   promote  
and  participate  in  India’s  foreign  policy  activities.  Such  a  business  association  is  the  Confederation  
of  Indian  Industry.    
  
The  federal  system  domestically  also  plays  a  large  role  in  India’s  foreign  policy.  The  liberalisation  of  
the   Indian  economy     brought  with   it   the  move   to  more  business-­friendly  states.  At   the  same   time,  
decentralisation   of   power   made   the   process   of   economic   reform   difficult,   due   to   more   diverse  
interests  having  to  be  moderated,  and  a  more  volatile  political  environment  with  diluted  power  in  the  
centre.  This  occurred  during  a  period  of  having  to  recognise  the  impact  of  globalisation,  not  only  on  
economic   liberalisation  but  on  political  activity  as  well   (Gordon,  1997:84).  Economic   reforms  were  
less  unified  in  their  drafting  and  implementation.  Economic  liberalisation  brought  with  it  a  shift  in  the  
forcus  of   foreign  policy   towards  other  Asian  countries,  and  the  United  States,  particularly  after   the  
Cold  War.  Due   to   the  explansive  nature   that  economic   liberalisation  and  globalisation  demanded,  
geo-­economic   factors   were   emerging   as   more   important   than   traditional   geopolitical   dynamics  
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(Gordon,  1997:89).  Economic  departments  in  the  federal  system  therefore  became  an  integral  part  
of  India’s  foreign  policy  apparatus.    
  
Chiriyankandath   (2004:202)  makes   the  observation   that   the   incorporation  of   investment  and   trade  
promotion  as  part   of   an  economic  development   plan   took  place   irrespective  of   party   positions  on  
economic   reform,  however  divergent   they     were.  This   resulted   in  wealth   creation  and   the  uneven  
economic   development   of   states   in   the   south   and   west,   who   are   more   easily   accessible   from  
Europe,   the  US   and   the  Middle   East   when   compared   to   the   east.   Jenkins   (2003:63)   attempts   to  
assess   the   extent   to   which   state   governments   are   influenced   by   shifts   in   India’s   economic   and  
foreign  policy  stance,  and  how  their  roles  have  evolved  with  these  shifts.  He  makes  the  observation  
that,  and  due   to   the  high-­profile  and  high   frequency  of   trade  and   investment  promotion  activity   in  
certain   key   states   in   India,   there   is   increasing   engagement   by   subnational   units   in   international  
economic  affairs,  and   this  evidence  offers  an   indication  of   the   level  of  decline   in   influence  and  an  
increase  in  reconfiguration  by  the  central  government  to  adapt  to  the  needs  of  the  economy,  as  well  
as  the  changing  nature  of  economic  diplomacy  in  foreign  policy  globally  (Jenkins,  2003:64).  This  is  
in   line  with  global   trends  in  what  Jenkins  refers  to  as  “constituent  diplomacy”,  making  reference  to  
the   work   of   John   Kincaid   on   increase   in   subnational   diplomacy,   where   an   increasing   amount   of  
countries   and   their   states   or   provinces   are   engaging   in   an   increasing   number   and   range   of  
economic   diplomatic   activities   with   other   countries,   multilateral   organisations   such   as   the   World  
Trade  Organisation  and  World  Bank,  and  multinational  corporations.    
  
In  addition,  as  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  Indian  industries  would  have  to  start  opening  up  to  
international  participation,  as  part  of   the  government’s  new  plans   for  economic  development,   their  
voices   also   rose   in   criticism   of   foreign   policy.   Since   the   1990s,   and   well   into   the   2000s,   these  
associations   and   labour   unions   have   slowed   down   privatisation,   and   the   lifting   of   subsidies   and  
tariffs.  On  this  point,  India  only  allowed  foreign  institutional  investors  to  access  the  equities  market  
in  1992.  
  
2.3.3   The  role  of  non-­state  actors      
  
At   the  Davos  2006  World  Economic  Forum,   the  Confederation  of   Indian   Industry   (CII),  along  with  
the  Ministry  of  Commerce  of   Industry  and   the  Department  of   Industrial  Policy  and  Promotion   took  
the   responsibility   to   rebrand   India   as   a   place   for   business.   The   Indian   delegation   attending   the  
summit   included   40   chief   executives,   and   used   the   opportunity   to   showcase   India’s   economic  
strengths,  commercial  prowess  and  soft  power,   through  the   inclusion  of  Bollywood,  and  Ayurvedic  
products  into  the  branding  of  the  country  (Kale,  2009:58).    The  alliance  between  state  and  business  
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reorientated  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  since  2000,  with  the  corporate  sector  promoting  “India”  
as  a  whole  product,  through  initiatives  such  as  the  India  Brand  Equity  Foundation  (IBEF).  
  
Kapur   (2009:203)  makes   reference   to   the  work   of  Sanjaya  Baru   (2009)  which   focuses   on   on   the  
influence  of  Indian  business  on  Indian  foreign  policy,  given  the  pro-­business  stance  of  the  BJP.  The  
growth  in  number,  and  strength  of  business  organisations  such  as  the  CII,  sector  organisations  such  
as   the   National   Association   of   Software   and   Services   Companies   (NASSCOM),   and   foreign  
business  councils  such  as  the  USIBC,  are  demonstrative  of  the  collective  influence  that  the  private  
sector   on   foreign   economic   policy.   In   their   outward   FDI   activities   and   global   profile,   Indian  
companies   have   increased   their   interests   as   well   as   their   bargaining   power   in   shaping   India’s  
foreign  policy.    
	  
2.4   The  soft  power  attributes  of  India’s  economic  diplomacy  
  
Mitra  and  Schöttli  (2007:20)  put  forward  the  argument  that,  while  India’s  political  processes  continue  
to  promote  the  country  as  a  vibrant  democracy,  there  remains  a  lack  of  consensus  about  the  core  
foreign  policy  stance  of  the  country.  One  of  the  key  building  blocks  of  India’s  soft  power,  as  derived  
from  the  discussion  above,  is  India’s  promotion  of  its  hard-­fought  for  democracy,  and  economic  rise  
post-­independence.   In   terms  of   the  economy,  a   large  part  of   India’s  soft  power   lies  not  only   in  his  
economic   growth   and   growth   in   size,   but   rather   in   model   it   used   to   do   so;;   the   contribution   that  
having  a  highly  skilled  population  makes  to  economic  growth,  and  stability;;  and  the  manner  in  which  
Indian  mulltinationals   are   global   leaders   in   their   sectors.   This   section   lays   the   foundation   of   how  
India’s  soft  power  has  evolved   from   independence,  and   the  contribution   it  makes   to   the  country’s  
economic  diplomacy  toolkit.    
  
Hymans   (2009:237)   discusses   India’s   soft   power   or   lack   thereof   (“soft   vulnerability”)   before  
independence.  This  argument  is  based  on  the  strength  of  the  British  Empire  at  the  time.  India’s  non-­
violent  freedom  movement,  led  by  Mahatma  Gandhi,  was  a  key  example  of  how  soft  power  can  be  
used  effectively  as  a  political  strategy.  Nehru  continued  on  this  trajectory,  putting  forward  a  “softer”  
kind  of  power  domestically,  and  in  international  relations.  The  growth  in  the  non-­aligned  movement  
was  a  clear  signal  of  the  attractiveness  of  these  principles,  and  a  good  example  of  the  success  of  
this   tool,   was   the   contribution   it   made   in   “hastening”   the   fall   of   the   British   Empire   worldwide.   As  
discussed   in   the  previous   section,   India’s   soft   power   through   its   foreign  policy   followed   the   same  
trajectory,  albeit  muted  due  to  domestic  issues  and  despite  the  change  in  leadership  that  took  place  
during  this  period.    
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Khilnani   (1997:57)  argues   that   the  non-­alignment  policy  was  out  of  date  by   the  end  of   the  1990s,  
and   that   India  was   lacking   the   foreign  economic  policy   finesse  demonstrated  by  Nehru  and   Indira  
Gandhi.   In   terms  of   the  soft  power  attributes  of   India’s   foreign  policy,  Shashi  Tharoor   (2012:277),  
the   former   Minister   of   State   for   External   Affairs,   makes   the   case   that,   amidst   the   increasing  
commentary  on   India’s   rise   to  becoming  a  world   leader,   the  paradoxes  of   this   rise  become  more  
evident:   depite   the   world   second   largest   population,   and   being   one   of   the   fastest-­growing  
economies,  it  is  still  a  country  with  high  unemployment  and  poverty  levels.  However,  India’s  rise  in  
prominence,  and  how   its   foreign  policy  has  adapted   to  match   this,  has  come  with   the   recognition  
that   “the  world’s   respect  will  no   longer  be  accorded  merely   to   the  strongest  and  richest  countries.  
Those  who  tell  the  most  persuasive  stories-­and  those  about  whom  the  most  positive  stories  are  told-­
will  fare  better  in  the  (global)  public’s  reckoning  than  those  who  win  wars.”  (2012:294).  According  to  
Dormandy  (2007:125),  India  wields  enormous  soft  power  as  the  world’s  largest  democracy,  and  its  
ability   to  use  democracy  promotion  actively   in  other  countries.  However,  when  one  examines  this,  
there  are  very   few  examples  where  India  actively  coerces  countries  who  are  not  considered  to  be  
democracries  to  change  their  policy  orientation.    
  
What   has   emerged   since   the   mid-­1990s   in   India’s   foreign   policy,   is   the   tight   alliance   that   the  
government  has  with   the   Indian  private  sector,   that  has   resulted   in  an   identity   that   forms  a  strong  
component  of  the  changes  in  India’s  foreign  policy  (Kale,  2009:59).  The  growth  in  large  number  of  
Indian   conglemerates   and   multinationals   who   have   expanded   across   the   global   economy   have  
become  a  part  of  India’s  foreign  policy  toolkit,  as  a  soft  power  tool.    This  is  in  line  with  the  previous  
discussion  on  soft  power  encompassing  actors  outside  of  the  state.    
  
India’s   soft   power   source   had   to   change   in   1990s,   not   because   of   the   changes   across   Indian  
leadership,  but  more  because  of  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  changes  in  the  Indian  economy.  
Mehta   (2009:218)   explains   how   India’s   identity   is   largely   grounded   in   power,   but   this   power   is  
definied   by   the   power   of   its   example:  By   showing   the   rest   of   the  world   how   to  maintain   a   strong  
democracy,  manage  its  diverse  population  and  have  a  distinuguised  economy,  it  will  be  seen  as  a  
great   power.   This   argument   implies   that   power,   and   soft   power,   is   the   result   of   these   efforts.   A  
contrasting  argument  would  question  whether  or  not  India’s  soft  power  was  consolidated  only  after  
its   economic   rise   was   secured,   i.e.   only   once   its   hard   power   was   in   place,   could   it   serve   as   an  
example  to  other  countries.    
  
The   liberalisation  of   the   Indian  economy  and  greater   integration   in   the  global  economy  and  global  
value-­chains   exposed   its   attractiveness   to   a   global   audience.   Hymans   (2009:252)   argues   that  
India’s   soft   power   lies   in  Bollywood,   the  nuclear   bomb,   the   Indian  diaspora  and   the   image  of   the  
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Indian   economy.   If   one   considers   these   carefully,   it   is   possible   to   deduce   that   all   four   of   these  
sources  are  the  result  of  economic  diplomacy  efforts.  These  are  discussed  below:  
-­   Bollywood:  The  promotion  of  the  Indian  film  sector  as  an  export  product,  due  to  its  size  in  terms  
of  value-­added  to  the  economy,  employment  and  viewership  in  India  (given  the  large  population)  
has  not  been  a  difficult  project  for  the  Indian  trade  and  investment  promotion  agencies.    
-­   The   nuclear   bomb:   The  BJP-­led   government   can   be   credited  with   changing   the   Indian   image  
abroad   to   one   that   is   “muscular,   realistic   and   cooperative”   (Hymans,   2009:253)   in   1998.   This  
can  be  considered  as  another  instance  of  India  confirming  its  “realism”  foreign  policy  approach.  
This  was  a  more  attractive  approach  for  countries  like  the  United  States  to  accept,  recognising  
India  as  a  mature  and  responsible  power.    
-­   The   Indian  economy:  The   rise  of   the  services  sector,  and   information   technology  outsourcing,  
the  high   levels  of   foreign  direct   investment   into   the   country   since  1995,  and   the  highly   skilled  
workforce,  have  all  raised  the  attractiveness  of  the  Indian  economic  model.  The  Indian  model  of  
growth   as   an   “export”   has   also   raised   the   country’s   international   profile   and   clout   in   many  
international   fora   like   the   World   Economic   Forum,   and   the   G-­20,   with   many   other   countries  
attempting  to  replicate  the  model  domestically.    
-­   The  Indian  diaspora:  After  1998,  the  Bharatiya  Janata  Party  was  critical  in  fostering  relationships  
with  Indians  abroad,  a  reversal  of  Nehru’s  dissociation  with  the  Indian  diaspora  (McCann,  2011:  
115).   The   Indian   diaspora   is   considered   a   key   source   of   soft   power   due   to   their   ability   to  
promote   Indian  political   ideals  abroad,  and   the  contributions   they  make   to   their   local  business  
communities.  A  critical  component  of  India’s  commercial  diplomacy  is  the  Indian  diaspora  across  
the  world.  Mistry   (2003)   also   highlights   the   importance   of   the   diaspora   in   India’s   international  
economy  policy,  given  their  influence  in  the  private  sectors  of  their  respective  countries.  This  is  
particularly  true  for  countries  that  are  not  only  key  trade  and  investment  partners,  but  also  those  
who  present  strategic  alliances  in  international  political  fora,  such  as  the  BRICS  or  the  Group  of  
20.  The  Indian  diaspora  and  community  of  people  of  Indian  origin  in  Africa,  in  particular,  present  
themselves   as   a   critical   foreign   policy   tool   in   furthering   India’s   economic   interests   on   the  
continent.    
  
The  liberalisation  of  the  Indian  economy  has  had  direct  foreign  policy  implications.  Liberalisation  is  
often  an  area  where  the  ‘hard’  and  ‘soft’  power  aspects  are  brought  together,  since  liberalisation  has  
first   and   second-­round   effects   on   variables   such   as   defence   spending,   and   economic   bloc  
formations,   for  example  (Sridharan,  2010:59).  The  same  author  argues  that   India  has  struggled  to  
grasp   the  multidimensional  nature  of   foreign  economic  policy-­making   that  accompanied  economic  
liberalisation.  Blarel   (2012:29)  discusses   the   indirect  and   inconsistent  nature  of   India’s  soft  power  
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and  makes   the   point   that   India’s   cultural   values   and   the   attractiveness   thereof,   have   increasingly  
become  a   contrast   to  Western   values.  However,   quanitifying   these   remains   difficult.   In   particular,  
measuring  the  impact  that  they  have  had  on  India’s  foreign  policy  goals  remains  unclear.    
  
When  measuring      soft   power,      especially   in   economic   terms,   it   is   rather   the   economic  model   or  
model   of   engagement   that   should   be   regarded   as   the   soft   power   asset,   to   the   extent   that   it   is  
attractive,  and  by  default,  successful  enough  to  be    desired  by  other  states  (Blarel,  2012:  30).  Prime  
Minister  Manmohan  Singh   oversaw   a   period   of   record   levels   of   economic   growth,   the  manner   in  
which   the  country  grew,  with  state  and  private  sector  cooperation,   increased  outward  FDI  activity,  
growth   in   per   capita   income   and   a   larger   voice   for   India   in   international   for   a   because   of   its  
successful  economic  model.  Since  taking  office  in  2014,  Prime  Minister  Narendra  Modi  has  placed  
foreign  policy  and  economic  policies  at   the   forefront  of  his  work.  More   importantly,  he  has  shifted  
more   attention   to   India’s   sources   of   soft   power,   even   by   leading   a   mass   yoga   practice   on  
International   Yoga  Day.  Drawing   on   previous  BJP   stances   on   the   diaspora,  Modi   reached   out   to  
Americans  of   Indian  origin   during  his   state   visit   to   the  United  States   in   2015.  During   the   visit,   he  
spent   a   large   amount   of   time   in   San   Franscisco’s   Silicon   Valley,   meeting   with   Indian   tech  
companies.  This  event,  albeit  small  in  terms  of  state  diplomacy,  brought  together  three  key  sources  
of   Indian  soft  power:   the   IT  sector,   the  success  of   Indian   firms  abroad,  and  an  appeal   for  greater  
involvement  from  the  Indian  diaspora.  Prime  Minister  Modi  delivered  his  maiden  speech  in  the  69th  
Session  of  the  United  Nations  Nations  General  Assembly  in  27  September  2014.  During  his  speech,  
he   reiterated   a   continuance   of   India’s   foreign   policy,   the   necessary   reform   of   the   UN   Security  
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3.   India’s  engagements  with  Sub-­Saharan  Africa  
  
“Africa  is  our  mother  continent.  The  dynamics  of  geology  may  have  led  our  lands  to  drift  apart,  but  
history,   culture   and   the   processes   of   post-­colonial   development   have   brought   us   together   once  
again.”6  
  
Political   and   economic   relations   between   India   and   Sub-­Saharan   Africa   used   to   be   superficial,  
especially  since  the  post-­war  period,  especially  since  they  were  linked  to  anti-­colonialist  strategies.  
As   this   chapter   will   show,   India   and   countries   in   Sub-­Saharan   Africa   have   stronger   economic  
connections   now,   due   to   globalization,   and   the   economic   rise   of   India   and   Africa.   As   India’s  
economic  foreign  policy  has  evolved  as  discussed  above,  so  has  its  policy  towards  Africa  evolved.  
Given   the   shared   colonization   experiences,   India   had   access   to   many   African   countries   as   the  
British  continued  to  trade  between  colonies,  particularly  along  the  east  coast  of  Africa.  However,  the  
process  of  pursuing  deeper  economic  and  foreign  policy  ties  came  to  a  halt  during  the  liberalization  
periods  in  many  of  these  countries  which  lasted  many  years.    
  
Niranjai  Desai,  and  Anand  Sharma  are  amongst  various  authors  of   the  evolution  of   India’s   foreign  
policy,   in   general   and   towards   Africa,   who   have   worked   within   the   External   Affairs  Ministry.   The  
literature,  therefore,  is  therefore  rich  in  its  practical  and  descriptive  overview  of  the  motivation  for  the  
African  continent  to  be  a  focus  for  India.    Indian  presence  and  India’s  economic  diplomacy  in  Sub-­
Saharan   Africa   is   also   discussed   academically   by,   amongst   others,   Beri   (2010),   Dubey   (2006),  
Cheru   and   Obi   (2008,   2011),   McCann   (2010),   Mawdsley   (2010,   2011),   Modi   (2011)   and   Naidu  
(2008,  2010).    
  
This  chapter  aims  to  explore  India’s  economic  diplomacy  engagements  in  Africa  alongside  its  own  
broader   foreign   policy   strategy,   as   discussed   in   the   previous   chapter.      The   chapter   will   look   at  
India’s  engagements  in  Africa  before  and  after  the  Cold  War,  and  the  impact  that  domestic  changes  
and   its   switch   in   foreign   policy   from   idealism   to   a   more   pragmatic   approach,   had   on   how   it  
developed   economic   relationships   in   Africa.   India’s   foreign   policy   toolkit,   the   institutional  
arrangements   that   have   come   about   to   support   these   relationships,   and   the   role   that   the   Indian  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Speech  made  by  Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh  –  India  Africa  Forum,  New  Delhi,  April  2008.    
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3.1   India’s  economic  diplomacy  to  Africa  before  the  Cold  War  
  
As   Niranjai   Desai   (2009:415)   attempts   to   provide   a   historical   background   to   India’s   engagement  
with  the  continent,  he  attributes  the  laying  of  the  foundation  of  the  relationship  to  Jawaharlal  Nehru.  
While  Mahatma  Gandhi   provided   an   inspirational   foundation   for  many   liberation   struggles   on   the  
continent,  Nehru  took  the  first  practical  foreign  policy  decision  towards  Africa  when  trade  sanctions  
were   imposed   on   the   apartheid   regime   and   the   High   Commissioner   recalled   from   South   Africa,  
during  his  tenure  as  Minister  of  External  Affairs  in  1946.  In  addition  to  this,  Naidu  (2011:51)  points  
out   that   the   initial   period   after   independence   was   characterized   by   India   reaching   out   to   African  
countries   through  support   for   the   liberation  cause,  and   for   their  own   independence.   India  become  
the   first   country   to   provide   scholarships   to   African   students   to   study   in   India,   even   before   it   was  
independent  itself.  A  situation  that  did  provide  a  supportive  backdrop  to  the  India-­Africa  relationship  
was  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement.  With  India  taking  on  a  leadership  role  in  this  movement,  it  sought  
to  improve  its  economic  interactions  with  African  countries  after  the  Non-­Aligned  Summit  in  Havana  
in  1979,  and  the  Group  of  77  conference  in  May  1981.    It  laid  out  its  proposals  that  were  grounded  
in   finding  coordination  between  bilateral  economic  strengths,  and  using   these  sectors   to  pursue  a  
transformation  in  the  bilateral  relationships  India  wanted  to  have  with  countries  in  Africa.  
  
As  Nehru  sought  to  promote  greater  democratization  in  the  international  economic  order  through  the  
Non-­Aligned   Movement,   the   geopolitical   impact   of   the   Cold   War   made   it   clear   that   Nehru’s  
ambitions   would   demand   resources   and   attention   that   India   did   not   have   at   the   time.   Another  
important  factor  that  gave  impetus  to  India’s  desire  for  greater  cooperation  with  Africa,  was  the  Sino-­
India   War   in   1962,   where   India   saw   the   half-­hearted   support   it   received   from   many   African  
countries,  and  saw  the  need  to  rebuild  its  political  relationships  on  the  continent  (Naidu,  2008:116).  
  
Post-­Nehru,  Indira  Gandhi  followed  in  his  work,  by  reassessing  India’s  Africa  policy  and  introduced  
the   Indian  Technical  and  Economic  Cooperation   (ITEC)  programme.  This   is  a  bilateral  assistance  
programme   which   trains   African   nationals   in   India   alongside   grants   and   technical   assistance   to  
small   and   medium   industrialization   initiatives   in   different   African   countries.   This   programme   is  
largely   regarded   as   a   form   of   development   assistance   and   is   therefore   not   included   in   the  
discussions  to  follow.    
  
Various  articles  (Desai  (2009)  and  Sharma  (2007),  credit  Indira  Gandhi  as  a  key  influential  factor  in  
India’s   long-­term   approach   to   strengthening   ties   with   various   countries   in   Sub-­Saharan   Africa:  
During  her   tenure,  different  African  government’s   took  measures   like  wholesale  expulsion  against  
the  resident  Indian  communities,  Uganda  being  a  key  example.  Yet  this  did  not  deter  India’s  overall  
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commitment  towards  cooperation  with  these  countries.  Rajiv  Gandhi  continued  on  this  trajectory,  by  
establishing   the   Africa   Fund   within   the   Non-­Aligned  Movement,   to   assist   ending   colonialism   and  
apartheid   in  Africa.  Naidu   (2011:51)  argues   that   it   could  be  perceived   that   India’s   closer   ties  with  
Africa  were  greatly   influenced  by   its   relationship  with   the  Soviet  Union,  which  aligned  with   India’s  
support  for  liberation  movements  such  as  the  ANC  (African  National  Congress)  in  South  Africa  and  
SWAPO   (South   West   Africa   People’s   Organization)   in   Namibia   and   RENAMO   (Mozambican  
National  Resistance)   in  Mozambique.  The  Africa  Fund  contributed   financially   to   these  movements  
(Desai,   2009:419).   It   is   clear   that   the   period   from   independence   to   1990,   is   that   India’s  
engagements   with   Africa   have   been   driven   by   ideological   aims   and   idealism,   promoted   by   the  
political  leaders  of  the  day.    
	  
3.2   India’s  economic  diplomacy  to  Africa  after  the  Cold  War  
  
The   end   of   the   Cold   War   and   economic   liberalization   in   India   brought   a   change   towards   more  
economic   linkages   with   the   continent.   As   the   Cold   War   ended,   and   the   international   economic  
system   began   to   re-­orientate   itself,   India   was   forced   to   re-­examine   its   quasi-­socialist   economic  
stance  domestically,  and  its  geopolitical  position  in  the  South  Asian  region  and  wider.    
  
Politically,   the  shared  history  with  Africa  and  shared  goals  of  a  more  equal   international  order   laid  
the  foundation  for  greater  cooperation.  The  economic  impetus,  though,  arose  from  the  changes  that  
India’s   economy   was   undergoing   domestically.   The   economic   liberalization   described   in   the  
previous   chapter   affected   India’s   view   of   international   trade,   and   investment.   Since   1991,   India  
changed   its   approach   to   economic   development,   towards   greater   private   sector-­led   trade,  
investment   and   overall   participation   in   the   economy   (Shrivastava,   2009:   126).   Similarly,   with   its  
foreign  policy,  the  rhetoric  changed  from  an  overly  ideological  tone,  to  one  more  linked  to  technical  
and   economic   cooperation   that   would   complement   the   economic   liberalization   reforms   that   were  
being  instituted  domestically.  Naidu  (2011:53)  describes  this  as  a  “sophisticated  blend  of  geopolitics  
and  geo-­economics”.    
  
In   terms   of   the   post-­Cold   War   relationship   with   Africa   specifically,   this   was   more   focused   on  
matching  the  economic  rise  and  needs  of  India,  with  the  economic  aspirations  of  countries  in  Africa,  
and   supporting   strong   political   relationships   with   the   AU   and   bilaterally.   This   was   overlaid   by  
initiatives  such  as  NEPAD  (New  Partnership  for  African  Development),  which  the  Indian  government  
supported.  This  characterized  these  relationships  in  the  1990s,  and  was  supported  by  the  need  to  
share   technical   expertise   with   developing   economies   in   Africa,   through   the   ITEC   programme.   In  
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terms  of  India’s  most  well-­documented  foreign  policy  goal,  attaining  a  permanent  seat  in  the  United  
Security  Council,  it  is  inescapable  for  India  to  pursue  good  relations  with  African  countries.  
  
According  to  McCann  (2010),  there  has  been  a  shift  towards  a  more  pronounced  strategy  to  India’s  
economic  relations  with  countries  on  the  African  continent.  This  has  been  particularly  pronounced  in  
its  relationships  with  West  Africa,  particularly  the  large  oil  exporters  like  Nigeria.  It  would  seem  that  
the  past  decade  has  seen  a  shift  from  East  Africa  and  other  Anglophone  Commonwealth  countries  
towards  West  Africa.  However,  South  Africa  has  retained  its  position  as  a  key  central  area  in  India’s  
approach  to  Africa,  as  it  did  politically  during  apartheid  and  the  liberation  struggle  and  economically  
after   1994,   as   both   countries   sought   economic   emergence   (McCann,   2010).   Malghan   and  
Swaminathan  (2008)  provide  a  more  critical  overview  of  India’s  economic  engagements  with  Africa:  
they   argue   that   the   current  model   of   engagement  will   not   result   in   gains   for   the   ordinary   African  
because  it   is  driven  by  the  extractive  resources  sectors,   in  environments  where  corruption,  both  in  
the  private  and  public  sector,  are   rife.  They  make   the  point   that   India  and   its  African  counterparts  
need  to  target  their  diplomatic  efforts  towards  basic  social  and  human  development  initiatives  rather  
than  the  transactional,  high-­level  programs  currently  being  pursued.      
  
Michael  (2014:341)  provides  one  of  the  most  recent  research  studies  that  make  the  argument  that  
there  is  sufficient  empirical  evidence  to  show  that  India  has  successfully  implemented  new  policies  
with  new  institutional   frameworks  to  support   its  economic  engagements  with  Africa.  He  makes  the  
argument   that  with   its  “Indian  approach”   to  engaging  with  Sub-­Saharan  Africa  countries,   India  has  
shown   the  ability   to  constructively  engage  with  African  countries   in   terms  of   trade  and   investment  
and  support  in  international  institutions.    
  
In  terms  of  India’s  “pitch”  to  increasing  cooperation  with  Africa,  Cheru  and  Obi  (2011:23)  argue  that  
India  uses  its  historical  solidarity  with  Africa,  which  it  grounds  in  the  non-­aligned  movement,  history  
of   decolonization   and   shared   developmental   challenges.   The   official   tone   on   promoting  
engagements   with   Africa   is   that   the   relationship   is   based   on   equality,   and   mutual   respect   and  
benefits  (Cheru  and  Obi,  2011:23).    
  
At   the   2005   Asian-­African   conference   in   Indonesia,   Prime   Minister   Manmohan   Singh   revealed  
India’s  more   balanced  approach   to   foreign   policy:   balancing   the   country’s   national   interest  with   a  
sense  of   idealism  through  promoting   internationalism  (Mitra  and  Schöttli,  2007:32).  To  do  this,   the  
Indian   government   had   to   pursue   different   ways   of   improving   cooperation   with   Africa.   This   was  
particularly   important   during   the   regime   of   Prime   Minister   Indira   Gandhi   because   many   African  
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countries  were  undergoing   IMF  Structural  Adjustment  Programs  and  receiving  aid   from  developed  
countries.  
	  
3.3   Drivers  of  increased  engagement  
  
Large   (2008:29)  describes   the   “language”  of   India’s   relations  with  Africa  as  having  been  based   in  
the   promotion   of   partnerships,   and   political   and  moral   solidarity,   but   since   the  mid-­1990s,   it   has  
taken   on   a  more  material,   pragmatic   and   commercially-­driven   tone.   India’s   status   as   the   world’s  
largest  democracy  has  always  been  lauded  as  a  cornerstone  of  its  attractiveness  and  soft  power  in  
Africa,   but   more   recently,   the   solidarity   of   its   colonial   past   and   subsequent   economic   rise   have  
emerged   as   being   more   important.   India’s   growing   relationship   with   countries   that   are   not  
“democratic”  such  as  South  Sudan.    
  
Investigating  the  key  drivers  of  India’s  engagement  with  Africa  needs  to  be  discussed  in  terms  of  the  
changes  that  the  Indian  economy  had  to  undergo  over  the  past  25  years,  beginning  with  economic  
liberalization  in  1991.  As  discussed  earlier,  this  led  to  rapid  growth  of  the  economy,  as  foreign  direct  
investment  flowed  into  the  country  to  take  advantage  of  the  large  market  size,  and  skilled  workforce,  
particularly   in   the   services   industries.   More   importantly,   liberalization   made   it   possible   for   Indian  
corporates   and   the   private   sector   to   expand   outside   of   India   (Carmody,   2011:   32).   This   rapid  
growth,  shown  below,  both  on  a  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic   level,   increased  the  need  for  
resources,  raw  materials  and  a  larger  market.  
  
Figure  1:  India  %  Africa  growth,  2000-­2014  
  
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  2016  
  
Cheru  and  Obi   (2011:15)  put   forward  a  number  of   reasons   for   India’s   increased  engagement  with  
Africa  since  2000.  A  primary   reason,   they  argue,   is  energy  security,  given   the   rapid  growth  of   the  
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Indian   economy   and   the   increased   demand   for   oil   and   raw   materials.   Patey   (2011;;   2014),   Obi  
(2010)   and   Vines   and   Campos   (in   Kragelund   et   al,   2010)   all   argue   that   this   demand   has  made  
increased  economic  engagement  with  many  African  countries  an  economic  and  political  imperative.  
By  diversifying  the  supplying  countries  of  oil,  in  particular,  India  is  able  to  maintain  energy  security.  It  
is  with  regards  to  this  aim  that  Indian  commercial  interests  have  become  increasingly  a  part  of  the  
Indian  economic  diplomacy  apparatus:  Oil  companies  such  as  ONGC  and  OVL  have  invested  in  oil-­  
and  mineral-­rich  countries  such  as  Nigeria,  Angola,  Libya  and  Egypt,   in  equity  assets,  exploration  
and   production   blocks   and   through   physical   infrastructure   such   as   the   pipeline   from  Khartoum   to  
Port   Sudan.   Pham   (2007:1)   makes   the   argument   that   India’s   strategy   is   grounded   in   resource-­
seeking,   for   oil,   copper   and   other   minerals,   and   market-­seeking   for   business   opportunities.   As  
shown  in  Figure  2  below,  India  has  diversified  supply  of  oil,  in  terms  of  geographical  region  and  by  
country.  
  
Figure  2:  India’s  oil  imports  by  supplying  country,  2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
While  post-­liberalization,   India’s   relationship  with  Africa  was  driven  by   resources,  one  could  make  
the  argument  that   it  has  become  increasingly  formalized  and  strategic   in  nature.  Desai  (2009:413)  
describes   India   and   Africa’s   engagement   as   being   driven   by   India’s   view   of   the   continent   as  
strategically   and   geopolitically   important.   Not   only   as   a   source   of   raw  materials   for   India’s   rapid  
economic  growth,  but  as  a  market  for  India’s  exports,  given  the  rapid  economic  growth  and  market  
growth   that   has   occurred   in   Africa   over   the   past   decade.   Beyond   the   economic   attractiveness,  
Africa’s  importance  to  India,  particularly  since  1990,  has  been  driven  by  the  goals  of  keeping  peace  
in   the   Indian   Ocean   and   the   need   to   ensure   an   alliance   from   African   countries   in   international  
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organisations   such   as   the   United   Nations,   and   on   other   economic   diplomacy   issues,   such   as  
international  trade  liberalization  within  the  World  Trade  Organization.    
  
Another   reason   for   increased   engagement   is   to   secure   a   market   for   Indian   goods   and   services  
(Cheru  and  Obi,  2011:15).  It  is  in  this  regard  that  economic  diplomacy  has  become  a  critical  tool  for  
the  Indian  government   in  securing  the  government-­to-­government  foundation  for   increased  access  
for   Indian   businesses   through   increased   trade   and   investment   opportunities.   At   the   2010   India-­
Africa  Conclave  in  New  Delhi,  participants  expressed  the  aim  of  scaling  up  trade  between  India  and  
Africa   to   USD70bn   by   2015.   As   shown   in   the   table   and   figures   below,   trade   between   India   and  
Africa  has  increased  steadily  since  2001.  India’s  imports  from  Africa  grow  by  6%  from  2010  to  2014,  
with   imports   totaling   USD459.3bn   in   2014.   India’s   exports   totaled   USD317.55bn,   growing   by   9%  
from  2010  to  2014.  
	  
Figure  3:  Trade  Flow  between  India  and  Africa,  2000-­2014  
	  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
The  figures  below  show  India’s  top  export  and  import  markets  in  Africa  in  2014.  Nigeria  accounted  
for  38.3%  of  all   imports   from  Africa,  South  Africa  accounted   for  14.85%  of  all   imports  and  Angola  
accounted   for  13.98%  of   imports.  These  are   the  only   three  countries  with  market   share  of   above  
10%,  and  are  also  three  of  the  biggest  African  exporters  of  crude  and  refined  petroleum  and  related  









	   42	  
Figure  4:  Imports  by  partner  country,  2014  
	  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
South  Africa   accounted   for   16.52%  of   all   imports   from  Africa,  Kenya  accounted   for   12.72%  of   all  
imports   and   Tanzania   accounted   for   10.73%   of   imports.   These   are   the   only   three   countries   with  
market  share  of  above  10%,  and  are  also  three  of  the  biggest  African  exporters  of  crude  and  refined  
petroleum  and  related  products  and  gold.    
  
Figure  5:  Exports  by  destination  market,  2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
India  also  saw  the  need  to  bolster  its  military  power,  primarily  to  sure  its  economic  interests,  in  the  
Indian  Ocean.  Given   that   India’s   oil   imports   need   to   travel   through   the  Horn   of  Africa   and   Indian  
Ocean   region,   India   has   increased   its   engagement   with   African   countries   in   this   region   through  
military  assistance.  This  was  particularly  important  in  the  late  2000s,  as  extremist  organisations  and  
piracy  around  Somalia  were  increasingly  becoming  a  threat.    
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An  important  point  raised  by  Narlikar  (2010:461)  is  that  India  has  been  more  willing  to  provide  “club  
goods”   to  Africa   through  projects   like   the  Pan  Africa  E-­Network,   technical  assistance  and   training,  
and   bilateral   preferential   trade   agreements,   and   increased   facilitation   of   trade   and   investment.  
These  goods  serve  as  an  example  of   the  use  of   “soft  power”   in  order   to  attain   foreign  policy  and  
economic  goals.  Through   these  engagements,  which  are  more  muted   than   free   trade  agreement,  
India  has  gained  support  for  its  foreign  policy  goals  in  other  international  fora  such  as  a  permanent  
seat  in  the  United  Nations  Security  Council,  and  its  goals  at  the  World  Trade  Organization.    
  
3.4   Economic  Diplomacy  Apparatus  
  
3.4.1   Institutional  linkages    
	  
The   institutions   which   have   contributed   to   the   formalization   of   India’s   economic   diplomacy  
apparatus   for  Africa  were  only   instituted   in   the  2000s.   India’s   seemingly   coordinated  approach   to  
economic   and   commercial   diplomacy   with   Africa   culminated   with   the   first   formal   institutionalized  
India-­Africa   Partnership   Conclave   in  March   2005,   which  was   attended   by   delegations   from  more  
than   twenty   African   countries   as   well   as   development   finance   institutions.   The   purpose   of   this  
conclave   was   to   bring   Indian   businesses   and   government   across   all   sectors   together   to   identify  
areas  of  cooperation.  It  was  launched  by  the  Confederation  of  Indian  Industry,  the  Indian  Ministries  
of  Commerce  and   Industry,   and  External  Affairs,   the  Export-­Import  Bank  of   India  and   the  African  
Development   Bank.   The   event   was   repeated   in   2006,   2008   and   2009,   in   addition   to   regional  
conclaves   across  Africa.   In   2007,   the   conclave  was   expanded   to   three   regional  meetings   held   in  
Africa,  in  the  Ivory  Coast,  Mozambique  and  Uganda  (Naidu,  2008).  According  to  Desai  (2009:425),  
the  conclaves  created  an  environment  for  increased  and  focused  economic  relations  between  India  
and  Africa,  as  well  as  an  area  for  increased  private  sector  engagement.  By  2014,  there  had  been  10  
CII-­Africa  conclave  meetings,  with  increasing  membership  and  attendance  (Michael,  2014:351).    
  
These  conclaves  provided  the  foundation  for  the  India-­Africa  Forum  Summit,  the  first  of  which  was  
held   in  April  2008.  This  event  has,   to  date,  been   the  most  structured  gathering  or  engagement   to  
strengthen   the   political   and   economic   sector.   The   event   was   attended   by   fourteen   African  
presidents,   and   representatives   from   the   AU,   SADC,   COMESA,   ECOWAS   and   the   Indian  
government,   businesses   and   private   sector   organisations.   The   outcomes   from   the   India-­Africa  
Forum  Summit  was   the   “Delhi   Declaration”   and   the   Framework   fro   India-­Africa  Cooperation.   The  
Summit  saw  the  Indian  government  committing  to  concrete  trade  assistance  through  lines  of  credit,  
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preferred   market   access   and   development   assistance,   as   well   as   scholarship   opportunities   and  
technical  assistance  programs.      
  
In   order   to   continue   and   enhance   the   systematic   engagement   with   Africa   in   the   coming   years,  
second   India-­Africa   Forum  Summit   was   organized   in   Addis-­Ababa   during  May   24-­25,   2011.   This  
was  the  first  time  that  such  a  meeting  between  India  and  its  African  partners  at  the  level  of  Heads  of  
State/Government  was  organized   in  Africa.  The   third  summit  on  a   rotation  basis  was  held   in  New  
Delhi,   India   from  26-­30  October   2015.   The   summit   enabled   consultations   between   foreign   affairs  
officials,   and   a   Heads   of   State   Summit,   where   54   heads   of   government   met   with   the   Indian  
government.    
  
3.4.2   India  EXIM  Bank  Lines  of  Credit  &  Trade  Assistance    
  
The  “Focus  Africa”  programme  of   the  India  EXIM  Bank  was   launched  in  2002,   to  provide  financial  
assistance  to  African  government  agencies  and  private  sector  organisations  to   facilitate  trade  with  
India.   The   programme   currently   covers   24   African   countries   and   is   considered   to   have   been  
instrumental   in   increasing   Indian   exports   to   Sub-­Saharan   Africa   (Cheru   and   Obi,   2011:19).   The  
“Focus  Africa”   programme  when   first   introduced,   focused   on   seven  major   trading   partners   of   the  
region,  namely,  Nigeria,  South  Africa,  Mauritius,  Kenya,  Ethiopia,  Tanzania  and  Ghana.  
  
The   India   EXIM   Lines   of   Credit   (LOCs)   are   made   available   to   countries   who   import   Indian  
merchandise  and  services,  and  these  are  tailored  to  every  countries’  economy  and  ability  to  repay.  
The   India  EXIM  Bank   is   a   key  economic   diplomacy  apparatus   that   the  government   of   India   uses  
facilitate  trade  and  investment  outside  of  India.  It  can  be  considered  a  good  indication  of  the  role  the  
government  sees  for  the  Indian  private  sector  in  its  economic  diplomacy  toolkit,  particularly  towards  
Africa  (Cheru  and  Obi,  2011:19).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  gauge  or  measure  the  extent  to  which  the  
gains   from   these  LOCs  on   the  African  side   trickle  down   to  empowering  small-­   and  medium-­sized  
African  businesses.    
  
These  LOCs  are  another  key  part  of  India’s  economic  diplomacy  toolkit,  particularly  as  it  pertains  to  
Africa.   The   programme   is   coupled   with   a   trade   preference   scheme   under   the   World   Trade  
Organization  Duty   Free   scheme   to   all   least   developed   countries,   implemented   since   2008.  Since  
April  2003,  the  scheme  applies  to  all  countries  in  Africa.    
  
The  “Focus  Africa”   initiative   is  a  good  example  of   the   integration  of  economic  diplomacy   initiatives  
from   India,  since   it   involves   the  Government  of   India,   India  Trade  Promotion  Organization,  Export  
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Promotion  Councils,  Apex  Chambers  of  Commerce  and   Industry,   Indian  Missions  and  bodies   like  
the  India  EXIM  Bank.  
  
Figure  6:  India  EXIM  facilities  to  African  countries,  2014  
  
Source:  India  EXIM  Bank  Investor  Presentation,  2015  
  
The  India  EXIM  Bank  also  has  partnerships  and  equity  stake  in  the  Africa  Export-­Import  Bank,  the  
West   Africa   Development   Bank,   alongside   its   lines   of   credit   to   various   government,   state-­owned  
entities  and  regional  development  banks.  One  criticism  that  can  be  raised  is  that  the  large  degree  of  
economic  diplomacy  activities  that  are  facilitated  through  India  EXIM,  are  based  on  credit,   thereby  
increasing  the  debt  load  on  many  African  governments  and  state-­owned  entities  in  particular.    
  
In   2004,   the   Indian   government   also   launched   the   Techno-­Economic   Approach   for   Africa-­India  
Movement  (Team-­9)  initiative.  The  initiative  focuses  on  nine  countries  in  West  Africa  (Burkina  Faso,  
Chad,   Equatorial   Guinea,   Mali,   Niger,   Senegal,   Ghana   and  Guinea-­Bissau).   In   order   to   broaden  
commercial   relations,   the   Indian   government   extended   a   line   of   credit   of   USD50million   for   the  
purchase   of   Indian   goods   and   services   (Michael,   2014:343).   While   this   can   be   considered   a  
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3.4.3   State-­led  infrastructure  development    
  
India  has  also  initiated  different  infrastructure  assistance  programs  in  Sub-­Saharan  Africa,  engaging  
directly  on  an  official  bilateral  level.  RITES  Railway  Consultancy  and  IRCON  International,  owned  by  
the  Ministry  of  Railways  in  India,  has  been  involved  in  railways  in  various  countries  in  Sub-­Saharan  
Africa,  alongside  financial  assistance  from  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  (Michael,  2014:344).    
  
An   important  project   that  can  be  seen  as  evidence  of   India’s  commitment   to   the  continent,   from  a  
diplomatic   level,   is   the   Pan-­African   e-­Network,   launched   in   2009.   The   state-­owned  
Telecommunications  Consultants  India  Ltd  were  tasked  with  implementing  the  network  at  the  time,  
and  in  2013,  the  management  thereof  was  handed  over  to  the  AU.  The  project  sought  to  connect  all  
53  member  states  of   the  UN  trough  satellite  and  a  fibre-­optic  network  to  India,  and  is  seen  as  the  
massive  undertaking  to  transfer  skills  through  tele-­education,  particularly  in  the  field  of  telemedicine,  
from  India  to  African  countries,  and  improve  rural  connectivity.    
  
3.4.4   Confederation  of  Indian  Industry  (CII)  &  the  Indian  company  footprint  in  Africa  
	  
McCann  (2010:110)  describes  the  Indian  government’s  use  of  the  CII  as  the  vehicle  for  advancing  
the  efforts  of   Indian  businesses  with  African  ambitions.  Since  2002,   these  have   taken   the   form  of  
business  conclaves,  and  investment  and  trade  missions.  In  its  engagements  with  Africa,  the  CII  has  
best   collaborated   with   the   India   EXIM   Bank   to   arrange   the   India-­Africa   Conclaves,   with   the   key  
shared  concerns  of  market-­seeking  and  resource-­seeking.  These   two  aims  have  been   the  crux  of  
the  Indian  private  sector’s  partnering  with  the  government.  By  using  the  EXIM  Bank  as  an  economic  
diplomacy  tool,  the  collaboration  with  the  private  sector  is  a  joining  of  soft  and  hard  power.  
  
The   CII   works   together   with   other   trade   and   industry   organisations   such   as   the   Associated  
Chambers   and   Commerce   and   Industry   (ASSOCHAM),   the   Federation   of   Indian   Chambers   of  
Commerce  and  Industry  (FICCI)  and  the  Federation  of  Indian  Exporters’  Organization  (FEIO),  all  of  
whom   have   identified   Africa   as   an   area   of   cooperation   through   trade   and   investment   (Desai,  
2009:422).      The   economic   boom   in   India   and   Africa   created   an   opportunity   for   large   Indian  
multinationals  to  expand  their  activities  in  Africa,  as  they  sought  to  expand  the  supplying  markets  for  
their   raw  materials  and   inputs,  and  expand  the  buying  markets   in   they  could  sell   their   final  goods.  
These  companies,  with  Mahindra  and  Mahindra,   the  Tata  Group,  Dr  Reddys  amongst   them,  have  
utilized   the  opportunities  presented  by   the  CII  and   the   India  EXIM  Bank   to  access  various  African  
markets.   Indian   banks,   such   as   the  Bank   of   India,   Bank   of   Baroda,  Canara  Bank,   and   the  State  
Bank  of  India  have  increasingly  increased  their  presence  in  Africa.  Figure  6  below  shows  Indian  FDI  
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flow  from  India  to  Africa  from  2003  to  2015.  As  shown  in  the  graph  below,  FDI  from  India  to  Africa  
peaked  in  2011,  and  has  since  declined  steadily.  An  investigation  into  this  has  revealed  that  many  
Indian   companies  have   slowed   cross-­border   activity   into  Africa   in   light   of   tougher   domestic   credit  
and   consolidation   conditions   in   India   since   2013,   and   the   significant   decline   in   global   commodity  
prices  experienced  which  started   towards   the  end  of  2014.  These   factors  have   led   to  a  decline   in  
cross-­border   FDI   from   Indian   companies   into   Africa,   and   a   decline   in   large   capital-­intensive  
investments.    
  
Figure  7:  India  FDI  flow  from  India  to  Africa,  2003-­2015  
  
Source:  FDI  Intelligence,  2016  
  
3.4.6   Indian  Diaspora  
	  
Historically,   Indian  slaves  were  shipped   to  Africa  as  part  of   the   rise  of   the  Commonwealth  on   the  
continent,   and   to   address   the   need   for   labour   as   the   Britain   attempted   to   institute   industrial   and  
mining   activity   in   the   various   countries.   According   to   Sherpa   (1994),   British   East   Africa   had   a  
population   of   around   330,000   Indians   by   1960,   with   many   of   them   skilled   as   businessman.  
Therefore,   the   presence   of   these   large   Indian   populations   outside   of   India   led   to   the   Indian  
government  post-­independence,  declaring  Africa  as  a  foreign  policy  priority  after  1947.  Despite  this,  
the   divided   support   shown   towards   India   during   the   Sino-­Indian  War   in   1962   from  many   African  
countries  awakened  the  need  to  counter  and  compete  with  Chinese  interests  on  the  continent.  The  
government’s  favourable  policy  towards  People  of  Indian  Origin  (PIO)  was  only  implemented  by  the  
BJP  in  1998.  The  BJP  initiated  a  parliament  of  PIO  in  New  Delhi  in  1998,  to  engage  this  group  as  a  
foreign  policy  actor  and  tool.  The  Indian  diaspora  in  South  Africa  is  considered  to  be  the  largest  in  
Africa,  from  as  early  as  1886.  There  was  not  always  harmonious  relationship  between  African  and  
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Indian  communities.  There  was  a  perception  that  Indian  traders  engaged  in  commercial  exploitation  
in  East  and  Southern  Africa,  in  particular.  Some  examples  cited  by  scholars  include  anti-­Indian  riots  
in  Durban  in  1949,  and  the  expulsion  of  Indians  from  Uganda  by  President  Idi  Amin.  
  
India’s  use  of  the  diaspora  in  Africa  has  often  been  described  as  a  key  economic  diplomacy  tool,  as  
it   tries   to  expand   relations  with   the  continent.  According   to  Michael   (2014:350)  6  million  out  of  25  
million  people  of  Indian  origin  living  outside  of  India,  reside  in  Sub-­Saharan  Africa.  The  diaspora  not  
only  contribute   in   terms  of  business  opportunities  and   linkages,  but   they  act  as  a  key  resource  as  
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4.   India  in  Kenya  and  Nigeria    
	  
4.1   Introduction  
	  
Having  examined  India’s  overall  economic  diplomacy  strategy  towards  Sub-­Saharan  African  in  the  
previous  chapter,  this  chapter  will  examine  the  nuances,  if  any,  in  India’s  engagements  with  Kenya  
and   Nigeria.   These   two   examples   were   selected   due   to   the   fact   that   they   are   the   two   largest  
economies   in   East   and   West   Africa,   respectively.   Given   their   influence   in   regional   political   and  
economic  affairs,  and  in  their  respective  trade  blocs,  it  would  be  important  to  see  to  what  India  has  
developed  a  distinct  and  nuanced  economic  relationship,  to  measure  to  what  extent  this  relationship  
has  been  directed  and  supported  by  the  Indian  government,  and  what   influence  India’s  soft  power  
efforts  have  been  harnessed.  
	  
For   the  purposes  of   this   study,  which   is   to   examine   the  gains   India   has  made   from   its   economic  
diplomacy  efforts  in  Africa,  the  trade  relationship  will  be  measured  using  India’s  export  performance  
to  these  two  countries  as  an  indicator  of  the  market  created  for  India’s  goods.    
	  
4.2   Kenya  
  
4.1.2   Overall  economic  diplomacy  strategy  
  
Historically,   the   relationship   between   India   and   Kenya   was   based   on   them   being   linked   by   the  
shipping   journeys   of   merchants   in   the   Indian   Ocean.   Their   shared   colonial   history   by   the   British  
facilitated  the  movement  of  people  from  India  to  Kenya,  with  the  first  Commissioner  office  for  Indian  
residents   in   East   Africa   being   established   in   Nairobi   in   1948.   This   would   become   a   High  
Commission   post-­independence.   High-­level   diplomatic   engagements   included   a   visit   from   former  
Indian  President  Sanjeeva  Reddy  and   former  Prime  Minister   Indira  Gandhi   in  1981.   It  was  at   that  
this  engagement  where   the   Indo-­Kenya  Trade  Agreement  was  signed.  The   two  countries  granted  
each  other   “Most  Favoured  Nation”  state  and  signed  double   taxation  agreements   to  assist   foreign  
direct   investment  and   trade  between   the   two  countries   (Nzomo,  2014:101).  Following  on   this,   the  
India-­Kenya  Joint  Trade  Committee  established  in  1983.  
  
In  addition,  a  joint  business  council  was  established  in  1985  by  FICCI  and  the  Kenyan  Chamber  of  
Commerce  and  Industry.  However,  this  group  has  only  met  six  times  from  1985  to  2010.  India  and  
Kenya   share   common   membership   to   the   Commonwealth,   the   United   Nations,   the  World   Trade  
Organisation,  the  Group  of  77,  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement,  the  Group  of  33  and  the  Group  of  99.    
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A  key  characteristic  of  India’s  engagement  with  Kenya,  and  the  broader  East  African  Community  is  
that   it   was   historically   based   on   ideology,   and   the   Non-­aligned   Movement,   in   particular.   These  
countries  all  suffered  through  developmental  challenges,  and  were  aid-­dependent  before  1990.  This  
formed   a   historical   foundation   for   cooperation,   based   on   a   shared   history   of   colonialism,   political  
ideologies  and  similar  aspirations  (Nzomo,  2014:90).  
  
While   the   tangible   outcomes   of   these   visits   are   not   clear,   there   have   been   a   series   of   high   level  
exchanges   from   India   to  Kenya   in   recent   years.   It   does  serve  as  demonstration  of   the  high-­level,  
cross-­sectoral  nature  of  the  relationship  between  Kenya  and  India.  The  following  list  is  provided  by  
the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  (2014):    
•   Minister  for  Overseas  Indian  Affairs,  Shri  Vayalar  Ravi  visited  Kenya  in  February  2010.  
•   Speaker  Smt.  Meira  Kumar  led  the  Indian  parliamentary  delegation  to  the  56th  Commonwealth  
Parliamentary  Association  Conference  in  Nairobi  in  September  2010.    
•   Commerce  &   Industry  Minister  Shri  Anand  Sharma  called  on  Prime  Minister  Odinga  and  held  
consultations  with  Minister  of  Trade  Ambassador  Chirau  Ali  Mwakwere  during  his  visit  to  Kenya  
for  the  6th  session  of  the  India-­Kenya  Joint  Trade  Committee  in  October  2010.  
•   Honourable  Minister  for  External  Affairs  Shri  S.M.  Krishna  visited  Nairobi  on  May  27-­28,  2011.    
•   Minister  for  Water  Resources  and  Parliamentary  Affairs  Shri  Pawan  Kumar  Bansal  visited  Kenya  
during  September  16-­22,  2011.  
•   Minister   for  Health  and  Family  Welfare,  Shri.  Ghulam  Nabi  Azad,  visited  Kenya   from  February  
12-­16,  2012   to  chair   the  20th  Executive  Council  Conference  of   the  Partnership   for  Population  
Development  (PPD).    
•   Minister   of   State   for   Human   Resource   Development   Dr.   Shashi   Tharoor   attended   the  
inauguration  ceremony  of  President  Uhuru  Kenyatta  in  Nairobi  on  9  April  2013  as  Special  Envoy  
of  the  Prime  Minister.  He  called  on  President  Kenyatta  on  10  April.    
Economic  diplomacy  institutions  that  have  facilitated  trade  and  investment  between  India  and  Kenya  
includes   the   India-­Kenya   Joint   Trade   Committee   and   the   India-­Kenya   Business   Council.   Both  
bodies  have  agreed  to  cooperate  in  various  fields  such  as  power  and  energy,  infrastructure  and  the  
services  sectors.  Given   that  Kenya   is   the   regional  hub   for   trade  and   the   largest  economy   in  East  
Africa,   India  and  Kenya  also  engage  on  a   regional   level   through   the  East  African  Community,   the  
Common   Market   for   Eastern   and   Southern   Africa   and   the   Indian   Ocean   Rim   Association   for  
Regional  Cooperation.  In  terms  of  trade  diplomacy,  India  was  a  key  partner  to  the  Africa  Group  of  
companies   at   the   Doha   Development   Agenda,   and   the   lobbying   for   Trade-­Related   Intellectual  
Property  Rights  (TRIPS)  in  2001  (Narlikar,  2010:459).    
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India’s   use   of   soft   power   in   its   economic   diplomacy   toolkit   in   Kenya   lie   not   only   in   its   use   of  
institutional   linkages   that   facilitate   trade  and   investment,   the   trade  assistance   through  LOC’s  and,  
but  also  in  its  economic  model  and  its  sharing  of  expertise  and  technical  assistance  to  promote  it.  It  
is   interesting   that,   outside   of   the  Pan  African  E-­Network,   there   has   not   been  a   greater   degree   in  
cooperation  in  the  field  of  Information  Technology  between  India  and  Kenya,  given  that  this  is  a  key  
strength  of  India  globally,  and  Kenya  in  Africa.  The  presence  of  Middle  Eastern  banks  and  financing  
in  Kenya  does  pose  a  degree  of  competition  for  India  since  there  is  greater  competition  for  market,  
and  the  Muslim  population  and  diaspora  from  many  countries  in  that  region  in  Kenya  also  continues  
to  grow.  Furthermore,  when  compared   to  Nigeria,   there  has  not  been  a   large  degree  of   state-­led  
infrastructure   cooperation,   especially   when   compared   to   the   Chinese   activities   in   Kenya.   The  
Standard  Gauge  Railway  project  is  one  such  example  of  a  megaproject.      
  
Another  area  where  soft  power  does  show   itself,   is   through   the  security  diplomacy  between   India  
and  Kenya,  which  has  direct  economic  consequences  as  well.  Both   India  and  Kenya   face  similar  
challenges   with   regards   to   terrorism,   piracy   in   the   Indian   Ocean,   and   instability   in   neighbouring  
countries.  Stability  in  the  Indian  Ocean  in  particular,  is  an  economic  imperative  since  it  is  the  trading  
route   between   the   two   countries,   and   for   India’s   imports   of   oil   from   the   Middle   East   (Nzomo,  
2014:102).   To   address   these   issues,   India   has   supported   Kenya   through   naval   assistance,   and  
technical   training   in   the   defence   sector.   An   area   where   cooperation   could   possible   also   be  
strengthened,  especially  from  a  state-­level  engagement  area,  is  in  the  devolution  process  in  Kenya.  
While   India   has   extensive   experience   in   federalism,   Kenya   has   only   recently   begun   a   rollout   of  
devolution,  slowly  providing  more  autonomy  to  47  newly  created  counties.  This   is  an  arena  where  
sub-­national  experiences  can  be  shared  between  Kenya,  particular  in  sharing  economic  diplomacy  
strategies  and  trade  and  investment  promotion  experiences  and  expertise.      
  
McCann   (2011:6)  puts   forward   the  argument   that   India-­Kenya   relations   reveal  an  often  neglected  
dimension   in   the  current   literature  and  analysis  of   India’s  economic  diplomacy  with  Africa:  Due   to  
the   fact   that   Kenya   does   not   have   the   natural   resources   that   countries   like   Angola,   Nigeria,   and  
Zambia  have,  there  is  a  sense  of  pressure  from  the  private  sector  on  government  to  further  deepen  
relationships   on   a   diplomatic   level.   India’s   contemporary   relationship   with   Kenya   is   reflective   of  
private  sector  market-­seeking  activities;;  given  that  Kenya  is  the  largest  and  most  diversified  market  
in  the  region,  with  the  most  developed  trade  infrastructure,  through  the  Mombasa  port,  and  financial  
markets.   The   high-­level   diplomatic   relationships,   as   shown   in   the   list   above,   that   exists   across  
sectors  in  India  and  Kenya  serves  as  a  demonstration  of  these  activities.  Nzomo  (2014:89)  makes  a  
similar,  important  point,  that  diplomacy  engagements  between  India  and  East  African  states  are  less  
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and  less  driven  by  solidarity,  and  the  Global  South  movement.  Instead,  they  are  pragmatic  and  led  
by  economic  imperatives  and  goals  that  India  can  assist  these  countries  in  reaching.    
  
The   Indian   diaspora   in   Kenya   is   an   important,   but   under-­utilised,   economic   asset      in   India’s  
economic   diplomacy   toolkit.  According   to  Nzomo   (2014:103),   there   are   70,000   Indian  diaspora   in  
Kenya,  who  control  30%  of  the  private  sector.  However,  according  to  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  
(2003),  only  15%  of   this  number  are  Indian  diaspora,  10%  are  British  citizens  and  75%  are  Indian  
citizens.   A   large   component   of   the   research   done   on   the   Indian   diaspora   in   Africa   is   focused  
towards  East  Africa,  and  not  Kenya  specifically.  Gadzala  (2011:101)  makes  the  argument   that   the  
Indian  diaspora  in  the  region  is  primarily  composed  of  professionals  and  small-­scale  entrepreneurs,  
to  a  lesser  extent.  These  communities  are  usually  highly-­skilled  and  well-­established,  but  their  ability  
to   serve   as   complements   to   economic   diplomacy  efforts   from   India   is   limited.   In   fact,   new   Indian  
entrepreneurs   to   the   East   African   region   have   complained   about   the   lack   of   attention   and  
engagement   paid   to   them   from   the   Indian   government   (Gadzala,   2011:101).   The   relationship  
between  the  Indian  diaspora  in  Kenya  is  heavily   influenced  by  the  view  of  the  local  government  of  
the  day.  Former  President  Jomo  Kenyatta  discouraged   Indian   involvement   in   the  economy  due   to  
the  disenfranchisement  of  Kenyans  during  colonial  rule.  However,  with  greater  Indian  representation  
amongst  policy-­makers  in  India,  this  is  no  longer  the  case,  and  there  is  increased  room  to  harness  
the   Indian   diaspora’s   utility   as   an   economic   diplomacy   tool,   especially   from   a   market-­seeking  
perspective.    
  
4.2.2   Trade  and  investment  results  
  
The  trade  relationships  shown  below  are  demonstrations  of   the  results  of   the  economic  diplomacy  
activities  described  above.   If  soft  power   is  grounded  in  the  relationships  between  states,   the  trade  
relationship  can  be  regarded  as  evidence  of  a  dependency  of  one  country  on  another,  for  economic  
gains.  The  graphs  below  reveal  that  India  still  derives  more  economic  gain  from  trade  activities  with  
Kenya,   given   their   strong   manufacturing   capacity   and   Kenya’s   relative   import   dependency.   By  
strengthening  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries  through  economic  diplomacy,  Kenya  is,  in  
terms  of  India’s  overall  trade  with  Africa,  the  second  largest  market  for  Indian  exports  to  Africa,  after  
South  Africa,  accounting  for  12.72%  of  all  exports.    
  
As  shown  by  the  graph  below,  India  and  Kenya’s  trade  relationship  since  2001  has  largely  been  in  
favour  of  India.  Indian  exports  to  Kenya  have  increased  by  25%  since  2010,  accounting  for  1.4%  of  
all  Indian  exports.    
  




Figure  8:  India  and  Kenya  Trade,  2001-­2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
In   terms   of   the   nature   of   trade   from   India   to   Kenya,   this   is   shown   in   the   figures   below.   India’s  
exports  of   refined  mineral   fuel   to  Kenya  accounted   for  68.57%  of  all  exports   in  2014,   followed  by  
pharmaceutical   products   (5.31%),  machinery   (3.94%)   and   vehicles   (3.02%).  Growth   in   exports   to  
Kenya   have   grown   significantly,   particularly   in   the   refined   mineral   fuels   sector,   where   exports  
increased  by  266%  since  2006,  and  pharmaceuticals  increased  by  362.56%.    
  
Figure  9:  Top  Imports  from  Kenya  to  India  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
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While  the  trade  relationship  still  shows  India’s  stronger  “soft  power”  position  with  Kenya,  the  benefits  
of  stronger  economic  diplomacy   ties  has   impacted  Kenya’s  exports   to   India  as  well.   India’s   import  
profile   from   Kenya   is   highly   diversified.   In   2014,   the   top   five   imports   were   organic   chemicals  
(28.54%  share  of  all   imports),   followed  by  raw  hides  (12.35%)  and  coffee,   tea  and  spices  (14.54).  
Growth  in   imports  from  Kenya  has  also  seen  significant  growth  since  2006  with  the  top  imports  all  
growing  in  excess  of  100%.  However,  from  2013  to  2014,  there  has  been  a  slight  decline  in  exports  
of  inorganic  chemicals  (-­1.47%),  coffee,  tea  and  spices  (4.22%)  and  edible  vegetables  (25%).    
  
Figure  10:  Top  Exports  from  India  to  Kenya,  2001-­2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
In   terms   of   FDI   (foreign   direct   investment),   Kenya   has   attracted   projects   from   Indian   companies  
across  all  sectors.  Since  2003,  a  total  of  39  greenfield  FDI  projects  were  initiated,  with  10  of  these  in  
the  financial  services,  software  and  IT  services  and  business  services  sector.  The  diversified  nature  
of   the  FDI   that  Kenya  has  attracted   from  India  demonstrates   the  opportunities   identified  by   Indian  
companies,  and  again,  speaks  to  the  benefits  of  the  multi-­sector  economic  diplomacy  approach  the  
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Table  2:  India's  FDI  to  Kenya,  2003-­2015  






Sep  2015   Tata  Group   Automotive  OEM   79.44   50  
Jul  2015   ISON   Business  Services   58.59   1000  
Jun  2015   Mahindra  Group   Automotive  OEM   118.34   38  
Oct  2014   Software  Business  Consulting  (SBSC)   Software  &  IT  services   187.47   61  
Jun  2014   Bharti  Group   Communications   74.99   51  
Jan  2014   TVS  Group   Non-­Automotive  Transport  OEM   710.05   348  
Jul  2013   Bharti  Group   Communications   74.99   51  
Apr  2013   Canara  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   18  
Feb  2013   ISON   Business  Services   235.51   1000  
Sep  2012   Apollo  Hospitals  Group   Healthcare   31.64   37  
Sep  2012   Bharti  Group   Communications   74.99   51  
Sep  2012   Hero  Cycles   Non-­Automotive  Transport  OEM   710.05   348  
Jul  2012   Ashok  Leyland   Automotive  OEM   1  107.26   864  
May  2012   Bharti  Group   Communications   13  452.35   89  
May  2012   Nestor  Pharmaceuticals   Pharmaceuticals   373.77   350  
Mar  2012   JMR  Infotech  (Trasset)   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   16  
Jan  2012   Koenig  Solutions   Business  Services   171.07   39  
Oct  2011   Apollo  Hospitals  Group   Healthcare   28.12   26  
May  2011   Nestor  Pharmaceuticals   Pharmaceuticals   58.59   60  
May  2011   Spanco   Business  Services   52.73   335  
Feb  2011   Su-­Kam   Electronic  Components   138.26   157  
Dec  2010   Mahindra  Group   Software  &  IT  services   199.19   222  
Oct  2010   Healthcare  Global  Enterprises  (HCG)   Healthcare   34.21   32  
Oct  2010   Spanco   Business  Services   52.73   335  
Jul  2010   Bharti  Group   Communications   530.78   1000  
Jul  2010   Nagarjuna  Group   Chemicals   12  420.08   942  
Jun  2010   Rainbow  Group   Paper,  Printing  &  Packaging   89.75   39  
Aug  2008   Manaksia   Metals   410.10   320  
Aug  2008   Tulsyan  NEC   Metals   182.67   143  
Nov  2007   Dabur  India   Consumer  Products   46.87   130  
Nov  2007   Glenmark  Pharmaceuticals   Pharmaceuticals   49.21   40  
Jun  2007   Dr  Reddy's   Pharmaceuticals   49.21   40  
Aug  2006   Life  Insurance  Corporation  (LIC)   Financial  Services   126.54   91  
May  2006   Ashapura  Group   Metals   23.43   18  
May  2006   Indian  Oil  (IOC)   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   260.12   54  
Apr  2006   Tata  Group   Automotive  OEM   118.34   38  
Dec  2005   NTPC  Limited  (National  Thermal  Power)   Alternative/Renewable  energy   2  714.84   54  
Jun  2004   Indian  Oil  (IOC)   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   41  009.69   705  
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TOTAL   76  252.84   9  192.00  
	  
  
The  soft  power  strength  of  India’s  corporate  sector,  assisted  diplomatically  by  the  state,  has  driven  
the  growth  in  the  economic  relationship  with  Kenya.  This  approach  is  well-­suited  Kenya’s  economic  
structure  and   lack  of  natural  resources,  which  requires  India’s  economic  diplomacy  activities  to  be  
more   targeted   at   “market-­seeking”,   or   Indian   companies   and   bilateral   engagements   aimed   at  
promoting  exports.  Despite  the  strong  Indian  diaspora  community,  the  Indian  business  community’s  
contribution  is  more  muted  than  one  would  expect.    
  
4.2   Nigeria  
	  
4.2.1   Overall  economic  diplomacy  strategy    
	  
The  economic  and  political  relationship  between  India  and  Nigeria  is  also  grounded  in  their  history  
as  former  colonies  of  the  British  Empire.  It   is  through  colonialism  that  Indians  were  sent  to  work  in  
African  colonies  as  the  British  moved  the  labour  force  around.  Kura  (2009:1)  puts  forward  the  view  
that   the   Indian   independence  movement  served  as   inspiration   for  Nigeria,  as   India  was   the  oldest  
British  colony,  and   it  paved   the  way   for   independence   in  other  colonies.  More   importantly,   India’s  
non-­violent   approach   to   liberation   was   implemented   by   Nigeria,   a   stark   contrast   to   other   African  
states.   India’s   continued   support   for   non-­discrimination   and   a   more   equitable   world   order,   in   its  
overall   foreign   policy,   had   curried   support   from   Nigeria   and   laid   the   foundation   for   diplomatic  
relations  between  the  two  countries.    
  
India  established  a  diplomatic  mission   in  Nigeria   in  1958,  even  prior   to   it  obtaining   independence.  
This  was   followed  by  a  visit   by  Nehru   to  Lagos   in  1962.  The   relationship  after   this  point   involved  
Nigeria’s  participation  in  the  ITEC  programme,  with  students  attending  Indian  universities.  In  terms  
of   shared   expertise,   the   Indian   government   assisted   in   the   establishment   and   operations   of   the  
Nigerian  Defence  Academy  and  other  defence  institutions.  Vasuvedan  (2010:3)  argues  that,  out  of  
respect   for  Nigeria’s   sovereignty,   India   did   not   intervene   in   the   civil   war   in   the   country,   but   it   did  
appear  to  neglect  the  diplomatic  relationship  between  the  two  countries  during  this  period.  This  was  
done,  in  spite  of  the  danger  that  such  a  strategy  would  have  on  its  role  in  the  West  Africa  region.  As  
early   as   1978,   the   Nigeria-­India   Friendship   Association   was   formed   to   promote   cooperation  
amongst  communities.    
  
In   terms   of   the   economic   strength   of   the   Indian   diaspora   in   Nigeria,   current   estimates   are   that  
around  30,000  people  of   Indian  origin   reside   in  Nigeria.  The   Indian  diaspora   in  Nigeria  and  West  
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Africa  as  a  whole  have  enjoyed  a  more  peaceful  co-­existence  with  the  government  of  the  day,  than  
what  has  experienced  in  East  Africa.  What  was  clear,  was  that  India’s  diplomatic  stance  in  Nigeria  
did  not  affect  the  market  that  Indian  businesses  saw  in  the  country.  The  Chellaram  Group,  was  the  
first  Indian  business  to  establish  a  business  in  Nigeria  in  1923  and  still  operates  today  (Vasuvedan,  
2010:4).  During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  Indian  private  sector  was  also  a  key  actor  in  the  Nigerian  
textile   industry.   Given   that   India’s   relationship   with   Nigeria   is   largely   state-­led   and   “resource-­
seeking”,   there   is   a   smaller   “soft   power”   role   for   small   diaspora   communities   to   play,   especially  
given  the  size  of  the  energy  sector  in  Nigeria’s  economy.    
  
Modern   economic   diplomatic   relations,   post   the   civil   war   in   Nigeria,   were   resumed   in   1998.   The  
Indian   government   offered   a  USD5million   grant   to   assist   Nigeria   in   small   and  medium-­enterprise  
assistance,   the   machine   tools   sector   revitalisation   and   the   restoration   and   restructuring   of   the  
Nigeria  National  Railways  (Vasudevan,  2010:8).  The  resumption  of  active  economic  diplomacy  also  
included  the  revival  of  the  Nigeria-­India  Joint  Commission.  
  
While  many  of  these  pledges  did  not  come  to  completion,  it  has  rather  been  a  function  of  domestic  
politics  in  Nigeria,  than  a  lack  of  engagement  from  the  Indian  government.  In  March  2000,  the  then  
Indian   External   Affairs   Minister   reiterated   the   Indian   government’s   pledge   to   assist   in   railway  
rehabilitation  (Lagos-­Kanu  Railway),  in  addition  to  the  revival  of  a  steel  plant  and  the  establishment  
of  a  100MW  power  plant.  None  of   these  have  been  completed,  and   the   railway   rehabilitation  has  
since  been  awarded  to  the  Chinese  Railway  Company.    
  
In   terms   of   diplomatic   engagements,   in   2007,   former   Prime   Minister   Manmohan   Singh   met   with  
former   President   Umaru   Yar’Adua   in   Lagos,   and   addressed   the   Nigerian   National   Assembly,  
pledging   further   cooperation   between   the   two   countries.   The   Abuja   Declaration   on   Strategic  
Partnership,  signed  by  both  partner  governments,  was  meant   to  solidify   the   relationship.      In  2000  
and   2007,   President   Obasanjo   conducted   a   state   visit   to   India   to   hold   discussions   on   the  
hydrocarbons  sector.  This  visit  to  Nigeria  was  the  first  after  an  almost  45-­year  gap.    
  
Table  3:  Diplomatic  Visits  from  India  to  Nigeria  since  2000  
Date   Representative   Focus  of  Discussion  
March  2000   External  Affairs  Minister  Satya  Mey  
Vijayte   Third  Session  of  India-­Nigeria  Joint  Commission  
December  2003   Prime  Minister  Shri  Atal  Behari  
Vajpatee   Commonwealth  Heads  of  Government  Meeting  
September  2006   Speaker  Lok  Sabha  Shri  Somnath  
Chatterjee   52
nd  Commonwealth  Parliamentary  Conference  
October  2007   Prime  Minister  Manmohan  Singh   Bilateral  Discussions  &  signing  of  Abuja  Declaration  on  Strategic  Partnership  
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July  2008   Special  Envoy  to  the  Prime  Minister  
Shri  Anand  Sharma   Bilateral  trade  discussions  
January  2010   Honourable  Minister  for  Commerce  
and  Industry  Shri  Anand  Sharma   Namaskar  Africa  event  
January  2010   Minister  for  Petroleum  and  Natural  
Gas  Shri  Murli  Deora   Bilateral  visit  
Source:  Alao,  2011;;  Author’s  own  
	  
In   August   2015,   an   “India   Show”   was   organized   by   the   High   Commission   in   association   with  
Confederation   of   Indian   Industry   (CII)   in   Lagos,   Nigeria.   The   theme   of   the   trade   and   investment  
promotion  event  was  called  “Enhancing  Trade  and  Investment  between  Indian  and  Nigeria”  and  was  
opened  by  the  Indian  High  Commissioner  to  Nigeria  along  with  the  Deputy  Governor  of  Lagos  state  
and  Deputy  Governor  of  Benue  state.  A  key  differentiator  in  the  relationship  is  that  Lagos  is  the  only  
African  city   to  host  an   Indian  Engineering  Export  Promotion  Council,   to  promote   the  growth  of   the  
machinery  and  electrical  equipment  sector.  
  
The   two   countries   strongly   oppose   all   forms   of   terrorism,  which   precipitates   a   degree   of   security  
diplomacy,   especially   since   the   Indian   government   is   involved   in   projects   on   the   ground,   which  
could  be  under  threat  of  terrorist  attacks.  Such  projects  include  power  sector  projects  in  the  Enugu,  
Cross  River  and  Kaduna  states.    
  
India’s   relationship  with  Nigeria,  on  a  multilateral  scale,  has  seen   them  as  members  of   the  British  
Commonwealth,  the  United  Nations,  the  Group  of  77,  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement  and  the  Group  of  
15.  The  two  countries  also  interact  within  the  Asia-­Africa  Strategic  Partnership,  the  United  Nations,  
and  are  signatories  to  the  Monterrey  Consensus,  and  the  Doha  Development  Agenda.	  	  
	  
India’s   economic  diplomacy  with  Nigeria  has  been   largely  driven  by   investments  and   trade  within  
the  energy  sector,  with   the   Indian  state   taking  a   lead  role.  There  has  been   increased  cooperation  
between   the   Indian   and   Nigerian   energy   ministries   in   this   regard.   India’s   involvement   in   the   oil  
sector  in  Nigeria  is  largely  in  crude  oil  purchase  contracts,  and  participation  in  the  refineries  sector.  
In   2005,   an   MOU   was   signed   between   India   and   Nigeria   to   further   deepen   cooperation   in   the  
resources   sector.   However,   despite   the   high   level   of   state-­drive   activity   in   the   sector,   Indian  
business  deals  remain  affected  by  domestic  politics  in  Nigeria.  The  reversal  of  oil  block  offers  made  
by   the   Obasanjo   administration,   once   the   Yar’Adua   administration   took   office,   due   to   what   was  
deemed  financial  irregularity  and  a  lack  of  progress,  has  left  India  open  to  greater  competition  from  
other  countries   (Vasudevan,  2010:7).  ONGC-­Mittal  Energy  Ltd  and   the  Nigerian  government   for  a  
USD6bn   oil   infrastructure   deal.   In   2010,   the   Indian   Minister   for   Petroleum   and   Natural   Gas  
announced   India’s  commitment   to  partnering   in  developing   two  oil  blocs   in  Nigeria.  Additionally,  a  
deal  was  concluded  between  ONGC  (Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Corporation  Ltd),  Mittal  and   the  NNPC  
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(Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Company)   to  build  a  refinery  and  pursue  activities   in   the  natural  gas  
sector  in  2010  (Cheru  and  Obi,  2011:19).    
  
West   Africa   as   a   whole   has   become   a   key   trading   and   investment   destination   for   the   Indian  
government   and   private   sector,   as   it   seeks   to   diversify   its   energy   sources.      In   return,   India   has  
utilized  its  soft  power  assets  as  a  post-­colonial  economic  success  story,   to  share  these  lessons  in  
West  Africa,  alongside  sharing  technical  expertise.  The  main  areas  of  cooperation  between  Nigeria  
and   India,   on   a   diplomatic   level,   has   been   in   the   ICT   and   defence   sectors.   Cooperation   in   the  
defence  sector  has   involved  technical  assistance,   training  and  trade   in  defence  goods.  The  Indian  
government  also  assisted  in  the  establishment  of  Information  Technology  laboratories  to  service  the  
defense   sector.   Another   area   of   cooperation   is   the   ICT   sector,   and   the   use   of   the   ITEC   (Indian  
Technical  and  Economic  Cooperation)  programme.  
	  
An  interesting  perspective  provided  by  Vasudevan  (2010:15),  is  the  weak  diplomatic  presence  from  
India   in   Nigeria.   Despite   Nigeria’s   economic   importance   in   the   West   African   region,   and   as   the  
largest  economy  in  Africa,  India’s  High  Commission  in  Nigeria  is  concurrently  responsible  for  Chad,  
Benin,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe  and  Cameroon.  It  is  therefore  not  well-­equipped  
and   operates   below-­potential   in   enhancing   the   country’s   economic   diplomacy   in   Nigeria   and  
promoting  trade  and  investment  opportunities  and  coordination.  
  
4.2.2   Trade  and  Investment  results  
  
As   mentioned   above,   India-­Nigeria   relations   have   been   grounded   in   the   energy   and   defence  
sectors,   and   this   is  evident   in   the   trade   relationship   to  be  described  below.  Based  on  2014   trade  
data,  Nigeria   is   India’s   largest   trade  partner   in  Africa.  Since  Nigeria  began  exporting  oil   to   India   in  
2006,  the  country  has  overtaken  South  Africa  as  the  largest  trading  partner,  with  its  share  of  trade  
with   India   increasing   since   2012.  Overall,   Nigeria   accounts   for   0.90%   share   of   India’s   exports   to  
Africa,  and  3.41%  share  of  imports  from  Africa.  
  
As  shown  below,  India’s  trade  with  Nigeria  is  largely  in  Nigeria’s  favour,  with  the  growth  of  imports  
from  Nigeria  significantly  higher  than  the  growth  of  imports  exports  from  India.  Exports  have  almost  
flat   lined   in   terms  of  annual  growth,  compared   to   the  significant  growth   in   imports   from  Nigeria.   In  
2014,  exports  increased  by  13.84%  while  imports  declined  by  0.86%.  More  significantly,  since  2000,  
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Figure  11:  India-­Nigeria  Trade,  2001-­2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
           
As  shown  in  the  graph  below  of  the  top  five  exports  from  India  to  Nigeria,  India’s  exports  to  Nigeria  
are  diversified   in   terms  of  sectors.  What  can  be  deduced   from   the  data,   is   that   Indian  businesses  
are   increasingly   finding  markets   for   their   products   in  Nigeria,   outside   of   the   hydrocarbons   sector.  
Vehicle  manufacturers   in  particular,   have  seen  exports   rise  by  1401%  since  2006,  accounting   for  
19%  of  all  exports  in  2014.  Pharmaceuticals,  machinery  and  electrical  equipment  have  increased  by  
215%,  165%  and  304%,  respectively.    
  
Figure  12:  India's  Top  5  exports  to  Nigeria,  2000-­2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
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As   shown   in   the  graph  below  of   the   top   five   imports   from  Nigeria,   India’s   imports   from  Nigeria   is  
dominated  by  hydrocarbon  imports.  In  2014,  this  product  group  accounted  for  98.96%  of  all  imports,  
with  the  total  imported  value  at  USD15.5bn.  Not  only  is  this  the  biggest  group,  but  since  oil  imports  
started  in  2006,  imports  of  oil  have  increased  by  176.7%.  The  graph  below  plots  oil  imports  on  the  
secondary   axis   in   order   to   demonstrate   the   increasing   trend   of   import   growth   for   other   goods.  
Imports  of   aluminum  articles   from  Nigeria   to   India   increased  by  195.17%  since  2006.  Goods   that  
have   also   seen   exponential   growth   are   raw   hides   (5000%   growth)   and   oil   seeds   and   grains  
(8295%).  This  trade  basket  does  demonstrate  the  opportunity  for  India  to  increase  its  engagements  
with  Nigeria   to   promote   trade   in   other   sectors   outside   of   oil,   given   the   increased   demand   shown  
from  the  growth  in  imports.  
  
Figure  13:  India's  Top  5  Imports  from  Nigeria,  2001-­2014  
  
Source:  TradeMap,  2016  
  
In   terms   of   FDI   (foreign   direct   investment),   the   Indian   automobile   sector   has   been   an   active  
participant   in  Nigeria,  particularly,  Tata,  Ashok  Leyland  and  Mahindra.  Since  2003,   this  sector  has  
attracted  9  FDI  projects  by  Indian  companies.  Similarly,  the  extractive  sectors  (coal,  oil  and  natural  
gas,   metals   and   minerals)   have   also   attracted   9   projects.   Noticeably,   there   have   been   31   FDI  
projects   initiated   in   the   financial  services,  software  and   IT  services  and  business  services  sectors  
since  2003.  The  diversified  nature  of  the  FDI  that  Nigeria  has  attracted  from  India  demonstrates  the  
opportunities  identified  by  Indian  companies.  What  this  data  lacks  to  inform  on,  is  the  level  of  state  
assistance  that  has  facilitated  these  investments,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  state-­led  investment  into  
Nigeria  by  the  Indian  government.    
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Table  4:  India's  FDI  in  Nigeria,  2003-­2015  
Project  






Nov  2015   Aegis  Limited   Business  Services   118.34   n/a  
Oct  2015   RateGain   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   500  
Oct  2015   Square  Yards  Consulting   Real  Estate   420.64   9  
Sep  2015   Tata  Motors  (SA)   Automotive  OEM   1  297.08   20  
Aug  2015   CIMGlobal   Business  Services   79.68   423  
Jul  2015   Vikram  Solar   Electronic  Components   33.98   17  
Jun  2015   Mahindra  &  Mahindra  (M&M)   Automotive  OEM   118.34   11  
Mar  2015   VVF   Consumer  Products   190.99   38  
Feb  2015   Wipro   Software  &  IT  services   84.36   243  
Jan  2015   Vizury  Interactive   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   55  
Jun  2014   ICICI  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   10  
Apr  2014   Jindal  Steel  &  Power   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   359.71   17  
Apr  2014   Wipro   Software  &  IT  services   65.62   163  
Sep  2013   Cyberoam  Technologies   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   70  
Aug  2013   Celkon  Mobiles   Communications   30.46   10  
Jul  2013   Cennergi   Alternative/Renewable  energy   4  073.90   10  
Jul  2013   Zomato.com   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   62  
Jun  2013   Vserv.mobi.  (Vserv)   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   10  
Apr  2013   Zomato.com   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   10  
Feb  2013   Coal  India  Limited  (CIL)   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   260.12   10  
Feb  2013   Mahindra  &  Mahindra  South  Africa   Automotive  OEM   119.51   54  
Mar  2012   HCL  Technologies   Communications   113.66   39  
Mar  2012   Mira  Inform   Business  Services   79.68   151  
Mar  2012   Khopoli  Investments   Alternative/Renewable  energy   1  822.00   17  
Feb  2012   Jindal  Africa   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   585.85   22  
Feb  2012   JSW  Energy   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   6  538.12   21  
Jan  2012   Shrenuj   Consumer  Products   190.99   116  
Nov  2011   Wipro  Technologies   Software  &  IT  services   1  534.93   243  
Sep  2011   Praj  Industries   Industrial  Machinery,  Equipment  &  Tools   33.98   1000  
Jul  2011   Larsen  &  Toubro  (L&T)   Industrial  Machinery,  Equipment  &  Tools   33.98   17  
Jun  2011   State  Bank  of  India  (SBI)   Financial  Services   128.89   17  
May  2011   Dabur  India   Consumer  Products   190.99   17  
Apr  2011   Country  Club  India  Limited  (CCIL)   Leisure  &  Entertainment   92.56   243  
Mar  2011   Somany  Ceramics   Ceramics  &  Glass   135.92   4  
Feb  2011   SRF   Plastics   647.60   148  
Feb  2011   Sumi  Motherson  Group   Automotive  Components   220.28   497  
Jan  2011   Minerals  and  Metals  Trading  (MMTC)   Minerals   24.61   165  
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Oct  2010   Suzlon  Energy   Engines  &  Turbines   92.56   13  
Sep  2010   Aegis  Limited   Business  Services   171.07   13  
Jul  2010   Mahindra  &  Mahindra  (M&M)   Industrial  Machinery,  Equipment  &  Tools   285.90   39  
Mar  2010   Apollo  Tyres   Rubber   621.00   401  
Mar  2010   Apollo  Tyres   Rubber   621.00   217  
Dec  2009   Union  Bank  of  India   Financial  Services   128.89   217  
Oct  2009   ITC  Infotech   Software  &  IT  services   161.70   17  
Oct  2009   Shrenuj   Consumer  Products   51.56   49  
Sep  2009   Cura  Software  Solutions   Software  &  IT  services   179.27   18  
Jul  2009   Aurobindo  Pharma   Biotechnology   117.17   162  
Jun  2009   Systime   Software  &  IT  services   67.96   88  
Apr  2009   Tata  Steel   Metals   3  748.29   10  
Jan  2009   Canara  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   1012  
Dec  2008   Tega  Industries   Industrial  Machinery,  Equipment  &  Tools   119.98   17  
Oct  2008   Tata  Steel   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   19  230.03   74  
Jun  2008   Apollo  Tyres   Rubber   621.00   146  
Jun  2008   Apollo  Tyres   Rubber   621.00   217  
Jun  2008   Bank  of  India  (BOI)   Financial  Services   128.89   217  
Apr  2008   Tata  Motors  (SA)   Automotive  OEM   191.69   17  
Nov  2007   Tata  Consultancy  Services  (TCS)   Software  &  IT  services   161.70   98  
Aug  2007   Bank  of  Baroda   Financial  Services   128.89   49  
Oct  2006   Ashok  Leyland   Automotive  OEM   1  121.32   17  
May  2006   Bank  of  India  (BOI)   Financial  Services   128.89   423  
May  2006   Indian  Oil  (IOC)   Coal,  Oil  and  Natural  Gas   260.12   17  
Apr  2006   Indian  Hotels   Hotels  &  Tourism   1  520.87   54  
Dec  2005   Tata  Motors   Automotive  OEM   119.51   280  
Nov  2005   Tata  Motors   Automotive  OEM   1  121.32   39  
Dec  2004   Teledata  Informatics   Software  &  IT  services   23.43   423  
Oct  2004   ICICI  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   9  
Sep  2004   Mahindra  &  Mahindra  (M&M)   Automotive  OEM   118.34   17  
Aug  2004   Usha  Comm   Software  &  IT  services   179.27   38  
Apr  2004   Indusind  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   162  
Apr  2004   Syndicate  Bank   Financial  Services   128.89   17  
Nov  2003   Tata  Iron  &  Steel   Metals   621.00   17  
Oct  2003   Bharat  Biotech   Biotechnology   786.21   817  
Jul  2003   State  Bank  of  India  (SBI)   Financial  Services   128.89   124  
Feb  2003   Ramco  Systems   Software  &  IT  services   117.17   17  
Source:  Financial  Times,  2016  
  
While   India’s   activities   in  Kenya   can  be   seen  as   “market-­seeking”,   India’s   economic  diplomacy   in  
Nigeria  can  be  described  as  “resource-­seeking”,  which  has  resulted  in  a  Nigeria  holding  a  stronger  
soft  power  position,  even  as  India’s  largest  trading  partner  in  Africa.  Economic  diplomacy  activities  
from   the   Indian   government   have   been   motivated   by   its   own   energy   needs   and   supporting   its  
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economic  goals,  even  so  far  as  to  become  directly   involved   in   the  hydrocarbons  sector   in  Nigeria,  
through  the  state-­owned  oil  company.  The  difference   in   the  two  approaches  to  Kenya  and  Nigeria  
do  demonstrate  a  nuanced  approach  to  using  soft  power,  and  economic  diplomacy  to  ensure  hard  
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5.   Conclusion  
	  
This  study  aimed  to  demonstrate  firstly,  how  the  changes  in  India’s  foreign  economic  policy  have  led  
to  a  more  directed  economic  diplomacy  strategy,  and  secondly,  how  this  strategy  has  been  put  into  
practice  in  Africa,  using  Nigeria  and  Kenya  as  examples.  These  two  countries  were  selected  due  to  
their  economic  leadership  in  West  and  East  Africa,  respectively,  and  because  of  their  very  different  
economic  structure  and  relationship  to  India.  
  
What  India’s  foreign  policy  reorientation  has  demonstrated,  is  that  soft  power  has  emerged  as  a  key  
economic   diplomacy   tool.   India’s   history   of   being   colonised   and   its   leadership   in   global  
organisations  such  as   the  Non-­Alignment  Movement  has  made      the  country  an  example   for  other  
countries  to  follow.  The  reorientation  of  the  Indian    economy  and  putting  into  practice  foreign  policy  
that   supports   its   economic   goal,   has   attracted   many   countries   to   its   model   of   growth.   The  
liberalisation  of  the  economy  in  1991  forced  a  refocus  in  Indian  foreign  policy  towards  the  rest  of  the  
world,   and   Africa   in   particular,   from   one   that   is   based   in   idealism,   towards   one   that   is   more  
pragmatic  and  realist  –  aligning  foreign  policy  decisions  to  serve  the  economic  and  political  goals  of  
the  country  as  it  has  become  one  of  the  largest  economies  in  the  world.  India’s  alliances  within  the  
BRICS   and   IBSA   groupings   also   serve   as   a   further   sign   of   deviation   away   from   the   idealism  
practiced  in  foreign  policy  during  the  popularity  of  the  Non-­Aligned  Movement.    
  
What   is  also  clear,   is   that   the   increasingly  pragmatic  nature  of   India’s  economic  diplomacy  efforts  
especially  since  economic  liberalisation  in  1991  has  not  changed  under  the  different  ruling  parties,  
new   Indian  Prime  Ministers  and  new  Ministers  of  External  Affairs.  Since  1991,  both   the  Congress  
Party  and  BJP  have  held  power,  yet  economic  diplomacy  efforts  have  remained  with  the  institutions  
that  have  been  created  for  them.  More  specifically  for  India’s  economic  engagements  with  Africa,  is  
that  these  institutional   linkages  such  as  the  India-­African  Forum  summits  and  the  cooperation  with  
the   India  EXIM  Bank  have   increased  and  deepened.  Given   the  BJP’s  previous  demonstrations  of  
support  for  the  Indian  diaspora,  when  they  previously  held  power,  it  would  important  to  see  whether  
the   current   administration   under   Prime   Minister   Narendra   Modi   is   able   to   further   deepen   these  
relationships  and  better  utilise  the  these  communities  as  soft  power  assets.    
  
If   one  examines   the  examples   set   forward,  what   is   clear   from   the   relationship  between   India  and  
Kenya,   and   the   broader   East   Africa,   is   that   the   soft   power   of   India’s   corporate   sector   and   their  
cross-­border   activities   has   driven   the   growth   in   the   economic   relationship   between   these   two  
countries.  When  compared  to  India’s  activities  in  West  Africa  and  Nigeria  in  particular,  it  is  clear  that  
this   approach   is   a   result   of   Kenya’s   economic   structure   and   lack   of   natural   resources.   India’s  
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economic  diplomacy  activities  are  therefore  more  targeted  at  “market-­seeking”,  or  Indian  companies  
and  bilateral   engagements   aimed  at   promoting  exports.  Kenya  also  has  a   strong   Indian  diaspora  
community   which   could   support   its   economic   goals   on   the   continent.   However,   given   the   highly  
ethnicized  nature  of  the  domestic  Kenyan  economy,  the  Indian  business  community’s  contribution  is  
more  muted  than  one  would  expect.  An  interesting  avenue  for  future  research  into  this  relationship  
would   be   to   examine   the   economic   diplomacy   relationship   in   terms   of   the   services   sector,   given  
India’s  global  leadership  in  this  area,  and  Kenya’s  rise  as  a  services  hub  in  East  Africa  and  the  Horn  
of  Africa.    
  
India’s  economic  diplomacy  activities   in  West  Africa,  and  in  Nigeria   in  particular,  can  be  described  
as  “resource-­seeking”,  given  its  oil  resources.  The  Indian  government  has  played  a  larger  and  more  
active   role   in   fostering   the   relationship  with  Nigeria,  as   the  government  has   increasingly  seen   the  
need  to  diversify  its  energy  sources  and  become  energy-­secure  as  the  economy  has  grown  at  such  
a  rapid  pace.  Nigeria  is  currently  India’s  largest  trading  partner  in  Africa.  The  Indian  government  has  
become   directly   involved   in   the   hydrocarbons   sector   in   Nigeria,   through   the   state-­owned   oil  
company.  This  is  a  different  approach  to  Kenya,  and  it  further  demonstrates  the  pragmatism  at  play  
in   India’s   economic   diplomacy   activities.   Furthermore,   India’s   history   as   a   former   colony   and   its  
economic  model  of  growth  and  the  success  of  its  corporates  has  also  emerged  as  a  soft  power  tool,  
beyond  the  diaspora.  
  
What   has   emerged   from   the   study   is   the   recognition   of   the   small   amount   of   academic   study   on  
comparing   India’s   use   of   soft   power   in   Africa,   on   a   country-­level,   and   on   a   regional   level   within  
Africa.  A  significant  amount  of  research  has  been  conducted  on  the  India-­South  Africa  relationship,  
and  the  inclusion  of  South  Africa  to  this  East  vs  West  Africa  approach  could  also  add  to  the  body  of  
literature  on  India’s  economic  diplomacy.  Furthermore,  the  evolution  of  India’s  soft  power  use  on  the  
continent  could  be  further  examined,  especially  from  a  corporate-­sector   led  approach,  and  beyond  
studies  on  the  diaspora.    
  
From   a   policy   perspective,   the   diversification   of   trade   partners   for   countries   in   Africa,   and   the  
increased  avenues  for  financial  assistance  and  cooperation,  whether  it  be  from  China  or  the  Middle  
East,   should  be  a  concern   for   India.  Should   India  want   to   increase   its  presence  on   the  continent,  
whether   it   be   through   bilateral   trade,   investment   or   greater   provision   of   “club   goods”   to   regional  
blocs  in  Africa  or  the  continent  as  a  whole,  it  will  need  to  more  aggressively  harness  its  relationships  
with  its  partners  on  the  continent.  What  the  examples  of  Kenya  and  Nigeria  have  shown  is  that  there  
is   significant   demand   for   Indian   goods,   and   growing   markets   for   Indian   investment   activity,   and  
given  the  economic  pressure  on  other  emerging  powers  like  China,  Russia  and  Brazil,  India  is  in  a  
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prime   position   to   further   solidifying   its   economic   diplomacy   strategy   towards   Africa.   Furthermore,  
these  relationships  can  be  further  deepened  in  terms  of  support  on  multilateral   issues  such  as  the  
United  Nations  Security  Council  reform.    
	  
India’s   engagements   with   Kenya   and   Nigeria   have   also   demonstrated   that   India’s   economic  
diplomacy   strategy   towards   Africa   is   a   function   of   both   hard   and   soft   power   efforts.   Its   domestic  
economic  growth  has  contributed  to  the  growth  in  strong  corporates,  able  to  engage  in  cross-­border  
investment   and   export   activities   and   domestic   markets   able   to   increasingly   absorb   and   demand  
greater   volumes   of   imports   from   Africa.   However,   the   official   rhetoric   from   India   has   remained  
grounded   in   overcoming   colonialism   successfully,   and   setting   an   example   to   other   countries.   By  
utilizing  “smart”  power  by  exporting  technical  expertise,  and  serving  as  an  example  of  how  to  grow  
the  economy  successfully,  and  produce  an  attractive  workforce  and  a  strong  corporate  sector,  India  
serves  as  an  example  of  how  economic  diplomacy  can  be  an  arena  where  soft  power  efforts  can  
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